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ABSTRACT 
This thesis concerns the interactions between asymmetrically 
informed agents where information can potentially be transmitted 
through the actions of the agents. Refinements of the sequential 
equilibrium concept are derived and applied to (i) a model of pretrial 
bargaining between litigants to a civil suit, where both parties 
possess private information, and (ii) a model of electoral competition 
where the voters attempt to deduce the private information held by the 
candidates. 
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The majority of economic models through the 1960s assumed that 
agents possessed complete information in regards to decision 
parameters for themselves as well as all other agents. This in turn 
facilitated development of analytic-based predictions of the 
performance of agents in a wide array of economic activity. Recently, 
however, analysts have been viewing the presence of complete 
information as a degenerate case of the seemingly more realistic 
environment where some if not all decision parameters of one agent are 
unknown to the remaining agents. This has led on the one hand to 
theoreticians establishing methodologies to guide analysis of such 
situations and on the other to applied economics considering which of 
the parameters lend themselves to relaxing the assumption of complete 
information and thereby lead to realistic, tractable, or interesting 
results. 
The work presented below attempts to discuss and influence 
both of these ongoing areas of research. The state of the art on the 
theory side has generated predictions from equilibrium analysis in 
which the agents' beliefs over unknown parameters are explicitly 
recognized in the equilibrium concept. Many of these predictions are 
a function of the latitude the agents are grants in their beliefs when 
faced with events inconsistent with the equilibrium path; i.e., events 
which the equilibrium predicts would occur with probability zero. 
Although any objection to this may at first glance appear innocuous, 
2 
the fact that the probability of any event occurring is determined 
endogenously by the behavior of the agents and the ability to 
influence others' actions by different threats of response implies the 
critical nature of beliefs out of equilibrium. Chapter I below deals 
with reasonable types of restrictions to place on out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs so as to limit the set of equilibria in any particular 
application. The general form of these restrictions concerns the 
informativeness of the equilibrium payoffs in establishing the 
willingness and ability of informed agents with certain information to 
deviate from the equilibrium path. Hence, in a restricted concept of 
equilibrium uninformed agents should deduce and incorporate this 
information into their beliefs, thereby requiring out-of-equilibrium 
beliefs to be consistent with some type of information about the 
unknown parameters. 
The goal of the subsequent chapters is to apply these 
refinement techniques to two models of strategic interaction. In 
Chapter II a model of pretrial negotiations between litigants to a 
civil suit is analyzed, where both plaintiff and defendant know 
whether or not they were negligent in actions prior to the accident, 
but where they don't know whether the other was negligent. 
Information about the defendant's negligence is potentially 
transmitted through a settlement offer to the plaintiff. If the 
plaintiff rejects the offer, they proceed to trial where the court 
determines the negligence of both parties and determines the 
appropriate allocation of resources. This allocation is a function 
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of the liability rule in place, where a liability rule assigns to each 
possible state of parameters one of the parties as responsible for 
covering the damages. Four liability rules are considered, and their 
effects on the equilibrium outcomes are contrasted. 
In Chapter III a model of electoral competition is developed 
where the two candidates possess private information regarding the 
position on a unidimensional policy space they will enact if elected. 
The candidates simultaneously announce positions on the policy space 
as a function of their "true" position, after which the voters attempt 
to infer these true positions and subsequently vote for one or the 
other candidate. This model generalizes earlier models of electoral 
competition in two fundamental respects: (i) it allows for a 
candidate's announced position and true position to differ, and (ii) 
it assumes voters cannot deduce ex ante what the candidates' positions 
if elected will be. Although the utility functions of th~ candidates 
are left unspecified except for signing the derivatives, the ability 
to restrict the voters' out-of-equilibrium beliefs inherent in the 
equilibrium concepts of Chapter I facilitates the predictive power of 
the model to a degree sufficient to state potentially interesting and 
insightful results. 
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CHAPTER I. EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the relationship between Kreps and 
Wilson's (1982) concept of sequential equilibria and Kohlberg and 
Mertens's (1984) concept of stability. It introduces a restriction on 
off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs that refines the set of sequential 
equilibria in signaling games. We call any sequential equilibria that 
satisfy our restriction on beliefs divine. For generic signaling 
games, every equilibrium contained in a stable component is divine. 
Moreover, the solution concept is restrictive enough to rule out all 
of the equilibria that Kreps (1985) and others dismiss on intuitive 
grounds. Thus, divinity provides an independent theoretical 
foundation for discarding non-intuitive equilibria in signaling games. 
In addition, a subsequent refinement of divinity, called universal 
divinity, is introduced. It is shown that, as with divinity, every 
equilibrium contained in a stable component is universally divine, 
while an example implies that the set of universally divine equilibria 
may be strictly contained in the set of divine equilibria. 
We provide a generic example to show that universally divine, 
hence divine equilibria may not be contained in any stable component. 
However, the chapter presents an explicit characterization of 
stability in terms of off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. That is, an 
equilibrium of a generic signaling game is in a stable component if 
and only if it can be supported as a sequential equilibrium with 
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restricted off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. Just as Kreps and Wilson 
(1982) characterize perfect equilibria for generic extensive-form 
games in terms of sequential equilibrium strategies and beliefs, our 
result characterizes stable outcomes for generic signaling games in 
terms of sequential equilibrium strategies and restrictions on 
beliefs. The characterization may be a useful way to compute stable 
equilibrium outcomes and to evaluate the consequences of using 
stability to select equilibria in extensive-form games. 
Independent of our work, Cho and Kreps (1986) analyze the 
power of stability to select equilibria in signaling games. Their 
results closely parallel our own. They identify restrictions on 
equilibria similar to those embodied by divinity. In addition, they 
also state our characterization result (Theorem 3}. Cho (1985} 
extends a restriction identified in Cho and Kreps to obtain a solution 
concept that refines the set of sequential equilibria in general 
extensive-form games. 
Our debt to the existing literature on solution concepts for 
noncooperative games is obvious. Recent work on this topic includes 
papers by Kreps and Wilson (1982} , Selten (1975}, and McLennan (1985}, 
who present refinement concepts for extensive-form games; and Myerson 
(1978), Kalai and Samet (1984}, and Kohlberg and Mertens (1984}, who 
present refinement concepts for normal-form games. 
2. THE MODEL 
In this chapter we analyze the equilibria of signaling games 
with finite action sets. There are two players, a Sender (S) and a 
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Receiver (R). The Sender has private information, summarized by his 
type, t, an element of a finite set T. There is a strictly positive 
probability distribution p(t) on T; p(t), which is common knowledge, 
is the ex ante probability that S's type is t. After S learns his 
type he sends a message m to R; m is an element of a finite set M. In 
response tom, R selects an action a from a finite set A(m); k(m) is 
the cardinality of A(m). Sand R have von Naumann-Morgenstern utility 
functions u(t,m,a) and v(t,m,a), respectively. 
For fixed T, M, and A(m) for m eM, the utility functions 
u(t,m,a) and v(t,m,a) completely determine the game. Therefore, if 
-
M 
L = [T x }:
1
k(i)] 2 , where Tis the cardinality ofT and M is the 
cardinality of M, then every element of mL determines a signaling 
game. We call a property of a signaling game generic if there exists 
D c EL such that the property holds for all signaling games 
determined by d e D and a closed set of Lebesgue measure zero contains 
EL\D. If a property of a signaling game is generic, then we say it 
holds for generic signaling games. 
For any positive integer k, let~= {6 = (&(1), ••• ,&(k)): 
k 
o(i) l 0 v i and ~ o(i) = 1} be the (k - 1)-dimensional simplex. 
f=l 
We refer to the (T - 1)-dimensional simplex most often; to simplify 
notation, we write A instead of A_. A signaling rule for S is a 
T 
function 
q: T ~A_; 
M 
q(mlt> is the probability that S sends the message m, given that his 
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type is t. An action rule for R is an element of fi ak(m); 
m2M 
r(alm) is the probability that R uses the pure strategy a when he 
receives the message m. 
We extend the utility functions u and v to the strategy spaces 
ak(m) by taking expected values; for all t 8 T, let 
u(t,m,r(•)) = ~ u(t,m,a) r(alm) 
aek"cm) 
v(t,m,r(•)) = ~ v(t,m,a) r(alm). 
a2k-cm) 
Also, for each A 8 a and m 8 M let 
BR(A,m) _ arg max ~ v(t,m,r(m))A(t) 
r(m) eak(m) t~ 
be the best-response correspondence for Rand for A c ak(m)' let 
BR(A,m) : U BR(A,m). 
A8A 
Definition. A sequential equilibrium for a signaling game consists of 
signaling rules q(t) for S, action rules r(m) for R, and beliefs 
p(·lm> 8 a for R, such that 
1) • V t e T, q(m It> > 0 only if 
• • u(t,m ,r(m )) =max u(t,m,r(m)); 
m2M 
2) V m 8 M, r(a •lm> > 0 only if 
8 
max } v(t,m,a)!J.(tlm); 
aeA(m) t~ 
3) if [ q (mIt) p ( t) > 0, then 
EeT 
In words, (1) states that q(•) maximizes S's expected utility, given 
R's strategy; (2) states that r(•) maximizes R's expected utility, 
given beliefs !J.(.}; and (3) states that R's beliefs givenS's strategy 
are rational in the sense that Bayes' Rule determines 11<tlm> whenever 
the probability that S sends m in equilibrium is positive. If 
q(mlt> = 0, for all t 8 T, then sequential rationality does not 
determine 11<tlm>. However, the refinement concept introduced in 
Section 3 restricts the values that these beliefs may take. 
Next, we describe stable equilibria. Our introduction follows 
- - -Cho and Kreps (1986). Fix a signaling game; let p = (pR,pS) satisfy 
- - -0 < pi < 1, i = R,S, and let q and r be strategies for S and R 
respectively ~hat satisfy q(mlt> > 0, \1 m e M, \1 t 8 T and 
;(aim)> 0, \1 a e A(m), \1m eM. ---A (p,q,r)-perturbation of the 
original game is the signaling game in which, if the players choose 
strategies q and r from the original game, then the outcome is the 
outcome of the original game if the strategy chosen by S is 
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refer to (p,q,;) as trembles. Let (q,r) be Nash equilibrium 
strategies for a perturbed game . If q(mlt> > 0, we say that a type t 
Sender voluntarily sends m and we say that R voluntarily uses the 
mixed strategy r(m). 
For a given signaling game, we call a subset C of the set of 
Nash equilibria stable if, for every e > 0 there exists o > 0 such 
that every (p,q,r)-perturbation of the original game with 
-0 < pi < o, i = R,S has an equilibrium no more than e from the set C. 
Definition. A stable component is a minimal (by set inclusion) stable 
set of equilibria. 
Our analysis depends on several properties. 1 
Proposition 1. For generic extensive-form games, the set of 
equilibrium probability distributions on endpoints2 is finite and all 
equilibria within a given connected component induce the same 
probability distributions on endpoints. 
Proposition 1. Every game has at least one stable component. 
Proposition 1. A stable set of equilibria remains so when one deletes 
a strategy that is not a best reply against any equilibrium in the 
set. 
Therefore, in generic signaling games, there exists a stable 
set of equilibria with the property that every equilibrium in the set 
agrees along the equilibrium path; the equilibrium may vary off the 
equilibrium path. A variety of off-the-equilibrium-path responses may 
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be needed to guarantee that any perturbation of the game has an 
equilibrium path close to a particular equilibrium path. Therefore. a 
single equilibrium need not be a stable set. However, we use 
Proposition 1 to justify an abuse of terminology. We call an 
equilibrium stable if it agrees with an element of a stable component 
along the equilibrium path. In particular, in generic signaling 
games, if an equilibrium is stable, then every perturbation has an 
equilibrium with payoffs close to the original equilibrium payoffs. 
3. DIVINE EQUILIBRIA 
Previous refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept place 
rationality restrictions on zero-probability events. In particular, 
sequential rationality requires that players respond optimally to some 
consistent assessment of how the game has been played. These 
equilibrium concepts do not require a player to draw any conclusion 
when a zero-probability event takes place. That is, although the 
refinement concepts embodied in sequential rationality and perfectness 
require that equilibria of games induce equilibria on any continuation 
of the game, these concepts do not require that a player 
systematically draw an inference from an opponent's unexpected move. 
Nevertheless. in order to decide how to respond to an unexpected 
signal, R should evaluate the willingness of s-types to deviate from 
equilibrium, and then incorporate into his beliefs the information 
that deviations from equilibrium might reveal. 
This section presents an equilibrium concept that refines the 
set of sequential equilibria in signaling games by placing 
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restrictions on off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. We begin by 
describing two restrictions on beliefs along with the intuition behind 
them, and then proceed to define an equilibrium concept that 
incorporates these restrictions. 
The first intuitive restriction on beliefs that we discuss 
requires R's off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs to place positive 
probability only on those Sender types who might not lose from a 
defection. Formally, this condition requires that if a type t sender 
• receives utility u (t) in equilibrium and 
• J = {t: u (t) > u(t,m,r(m)) for all r(m) 8 BR(A,m)}, 
• 3 . 
then r (m) 8 BR(Ar\J'm). Cho and Kreps (1986) also identify this 
condition and show that if an equilibrium is stable, then the 
4 condition must hold. • Our refinement notion includes this type of 
restriction on beliefs. 
Figure 15 describes a special case of a sequential settlement 
game (see Salant (1984) or Sobel (1985)). There are two types of S 
(the "defendant"): type t 2 defendants are negligent; type t 1 
defendants are not negligent. S offers a low settlement, m1 , or a 
high settlement, m2 • R (the "plaintiff") either accepts (a1) or 
rejects (a2) the offer. If R accepts S's offer, S pays R an amount 
that depends only on the offer. If R rejects the offer, S must pay 
court costs and a transfer depending only on his type (e.g. the court 
finds out with certainty whether or not S was negligent). If 
1 p(t1) = p(t2) = 2' then the game depicted in Figure 1 has two types of 
equilibria. 
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m1 I .1 a2 m2 I a1 a2 
'-5 ,5 t1 -6,0 t1 -6,0 -3,3 
'-3 3 '-5 5 t2 -11,5 t2 -11,5 I . I . 
Figure 1 
In one type of equilibrium, both types of Soffer m1 , and R accepts 
any offer; q(m11ti) = 1, i = 1,2, r(a1 1mj) = 1, j = 1,2. In the other 
type of equilibrium, both types of S offer m2 and R ~ccepts m2 and 
rejects m1; q(m11ti) = 0, i = 1,2, r(a1 1m1) = 0, r(a1 1m2> 1. In 
order to support this behavior, we need Jl(t1 1m1 > 
2 
~ s· We claim that 
the second equilibrium is not plausible because, in order to support 
it, R must believe that t 2 is more likely than t 1 to offer m1 • 
However, t1 prefers to defect whenever t2 does (and not conversely: 
consider an equal mixture of a1 and a2 given m1). Thus, a reasonable 
restriction on beliefs would require that the relative probability of 
t 1 should increase if R observes m1 • Our refinement notion captures 
this argument as well. 
Fix an equilibrium in which a Sender of type t obtains utility 
• u (t), and, for all t e T, the probability that t sends m is zero. We 
intend to restrict the beliefs that R can have given the message m. 
Since we deal with only one unsent message at a time, for notational 
convenience we drop the argument m from R's response function. 
Recall that ~(m) consists of all actions, r, available to R 
given m. Let 
• AG = {r e Ak(m): u(t,m,r) 2 u (t), for some t e T} 
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be the set of actions that some S-type weakly prefers to equilibrium 
actions, conditional on sending m. Our initial restriction is that R 
should believe that any type who sends m instead of the equilibrium 
signal does not expect to lose by doing so. 6 Thus, if R receives the 
signal m (as a defection from equilibrium), he should believe that S 
expects him to take an action in A
0
• 




• if u ( t , m, r) > u ( t) 
• if u(t,m,r) = u (t) 
if u(t,m,r) < u*(t) 
be the frequency that t e T would send m if he believed that m would 
induce the action r and t had a choice between sending m or obtaining 
• u (t). Next. let 
r(r) = {y e A: 3 ll(t) e ;(t,r) and c > 0 
y(t) = Cll(t)p(t) I v t 8 T}. 
such that 
Notice that r<r> is nonempty if and only if r e A0 • If it is common 
knowledge that m induces r, then the posterior probability 
distribution overT must be an element of r(r). Thus, r(r) is the set 
of beliefs consistent with R taking the action r in response to m (and 
• t earning u (t) otherwise). 
Finally, let 
=convex hull[ u r<r>J· 
reA 
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Thus, if A is closed, then f(A) is a closed, convex subset of the 
simplex A, and is empty if and only if A0 n A is empty. Since 
• r<~(m)) is empty only if u (t) > u(t,m,r), V t 8 T, V r 8 Ak(m)' R 
truly would be surprised by a defection from equilibrium, and there 
seems to be no reason to select one inference over another in response 
to m. Indeed, in this case, any conjecture supports the equilibrium. 
When A0 ~ d, and hence f<Ak(m)) ~ d, we think that it is not plausible 
for R to hold beliefs outside of f<Ak(m)) given the signal m. If R 
observes a defection from the equilibrium path, then he must form a 
conjecture over T based on that defection. 
Notice that any equilibrium in which beliefs lie in f<Ak(m)) 
satisfies the intuitive restrictions that we described earlier. All 
conjectures in f<~(m)) assign zero probability to any t e T with 
• u(t,m,r) < u (t), V r 8 ~(m)• Furthermore, if there exists t,t' e T 
such that J..l(t,r) = 1 implies J..l(t' ,r) = 1. V r e Ak(m), then for all 
beliefs in P<Ak(m)), the ratio of the probability oft' given m to the 
probability of t given m is at least as great as p(t') That is, R p ( t) • 
believes that t' is at least as likely to defect as t. 
Beliefs must lie in P<~(m)) provided two conditions hold. 
First, R believes that no type t would use m if t expected R to take 
• an action that resulted in utility less than u (t). This means that S 
expects R to take actions in A0 given the signal m. Second, s-types 
have a common conjecture over the distribution of actions that R would 
take as a response to a defection. This second condition may seem odd, 
since there is only one Sender. However, a "type" is a specification 
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of the information S has concerning decision parameters that are not 
common knowledge. Thus, it is possible for two S-types to have 
different conjectures over R's actions in equilibrium. If it is 
common knowledge that R holds beliefs in f<Ak(m)), then S should 
expect m to induce an action in BR(f(Ak(m)),m). This observation 
suggests the following iterative procedure. Let 
A, and for n > 0, 
r• r = n n' • A =nA n • 
n n 
Others use iterative procedures in the definition of 
equilibrium concepts. Specifically, given the assumptions that S 
expects R to take actions in A0 given an unexpected signal m and that 
S-types have a common conjecture over the actions that R would take in 
response to m, our iterative procedure coincides with that used by 
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) to define the set of rationalizable 
equilibria. 
Theorem 1· In generic signaling games, if an equilibrium in which 
• • q(mlt> = 0 V t 8 T is stable, then there exists r e A such that 
• • u(t,m,r) ! u (t), V t 8 T. 
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Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of Proposition 3. It states 
• that if an equilibrium is stable, then there exist beliefs in r that 
support it. We discuss the proof later in this section. 
Definition. A sequential equilibrium in a signaling game is divine if 
• it is supported by beliefs in r . 
Thus, by Theorem 1, every stable component contains a divine 
equilibrium. Therefore, Proposition 2 implies our next result. 7 
Theorem 1· Every signaling game has a divine equilibrium. 
We believe that divinity captures a minimal restriction on 
off-the-equilibrium path beliefs. Stability implies much more, but we 
are not convinced that these restrictions are plausible • 
• The set of beliefs in r depend on the prior distribution of 
Sender types. To check this property, one need only note that in the 
game that Figure 1 describes, 
for the equilibrium in which both t 1 and t 2 send m2 with probability 
one. •• r"' Let r be the intersection of the taken over all 
nondegenerate priors on Sender types. We can show that in generic 
signaling games, if an equilibrium is stable, then it can be supported 
•• . r** by beliefs in r . Call an equilibrium supported by beliefs in 
universally divine. To see that universal divinity is more 
restrictive than divinity alone, note that in Figure 1, the sequential 
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equilibrium in which S sends m2 with probability one is divine 
provided that p(t1) ~ t• but it is never universally divine since, 
regardless of the prior probability that Sis t 1 , R must believe that 
8 the unexpected signal m1 comes from t 1 • 
Cho and Kreps use Proposition 3 to further refine the 
equilibrium set. For a fixed equilibrium outcome and unsent signal m. 
call a type t bad for m if, for every equilibrium giving rise to this 
outcome, a t-Sender strictly prefers the equilibrium outcome to 
sending m. 9 Proposition 3 implies that a stable equilibrium can be 
supported by beliefs that give no weight to any type that is bad for m 
(if all types are bad for m. then the equilibrum payoffs strictly 
dominate any payoffS can obtain from a best response tom). To see 
that this condition is more restrictive than universal divinity, note 
that for generic signaling games. if tis not bad form, then e(t), 
the element of A with t-th component equal to one. is an element of 
r**.10 Thus, Proposition 3 also implies that in generic signaling 
r •• games, if an equilibrium is stable, then there exist beliefs in 
•• • that support it. Since r c r I Theorem 1 follows from 
Proposition 3. 
4. A CHARACTERIZATION OF STABLE EQUILIBRIA 
This section gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
sequential equilibrium in a generic signaling game to be stable. 
First. we present an example of a signaling game that has an unstable, 
divine equilibrium. The example motivates the notion of stable 
beliefs that we need to prove our equivalence theorem. 
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Consider the signaling game in Figure 3. 
-1,2 1,0 -1,-2 




) = 2· There exists a sequential equilibrium to this game in 
which q(m1 1ti) = 1, i = 1,2, r(a1 1m2 ) = 1 
supported by beliefs ~(t1 1m2 ) 2 t· This equilibrium is universally 
divine since 
r• -- r•• = A and 
• a1 e BR(r ,m2); also, neither t 1 nor t 2 is bad for m2 so that the 
Proposition 3 does not restrict beliefs. However, this eq~ilibrium is 
not stable. 
The stable equilibrium for this example involves both t
1 
and 
t 2 sending m2 with probability one and R responding to m2 with actions 
1 a2 and a3 with probability 2 each. 
Now we argue that the equilibrium in which S does not use m2 
is not stable. Notice that if S voluntarily sends m2 an equilibrium 
to the perturbed game in which S types expect to receive 0, then R 
must either use an equal mixture of a
1 
and a2 or an equal mixture of 
a3 and a4 in response to m2 • Hence, R must believe that the 
2 !. probability of t
1 
given m2 is equal to either 3 or 3 • Any other 
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strategy for R leads to positive payoffs for at least one S type or 
negative payoffs to both. Moreover. when R mixes equally between a
1 
and a2 , t 1 does not voluntarily send m2 and when R mixes equally 
between a3 and a4 , t 2 does not voluntarily send m2 • This argument 
establishes that if ~<t1 1m2 ). the probability of t 1 given m2 if S does 
I 
1 2 not voluntarily send m2 , is an element of <3•3), then there is an 
equilibrium to the perturbed game close to the original equilibrium 
only if the tremble induces R to take an action given m2 that does not 
I 1 2 attract either type of S. Moreover, if ~(t1 m2) t <3•3>, then the 
perturbed game has an equilibrium that is close to the original game 
and in which either t 1 or t 2 voluntarily sends m2 • Therefore, the 
equilibrium in the example is stable if and only if, given m2 , every 
best response to the set of beliefs in which the probability of t
1 
given m2 is an element of 
to both S types. Since a
3 
1 2 <3•3> leads to nonpositive expected payoffs 
1 2 
e BR((3•3>.m2> yields positive payoffs to 
both S types, the equilibrium is not stable. We apply an analogous 
argument in general signaling games. First, we identify the set of 
trembles that cannot induce voluntary action in any equilibrium to the 
perturbed game that is close to the original equilibrium. Second, we 
prove that an equilibrium is stable precisely when no best response to 
this set of trembles induces S to voluntarily send m. 
As in the previous section, fix an equilibrium that leads to 
• utility levels u (t), V t e T, and in which q(mlt> = 0, V t e T. 
For each J c T, define 
20 
I(J) • - {r e Ak(m): u (t) 2 u(t,m,r) V t 8 T, and 
• u (t) = u(t,m,r) if and only if t 8 J}, 
and, for r e I(J), define 
A(J,r) = 0.. 8 int A:~')..* sA with r e BR('A*,m> 
such that ')..• = [ a(t)e(t) + fl'A, for 
t8J 
a(t) 2 0, 1 - [ a(t) • fl > 0}, 
teJ 
where e(t) 8 A is the vector with t-th component equal to one and all 
other components equal to zero. Finally, let 
r "' { n 1\(J,r) if I(J) -F d 1\( J) - rei( J) 
A if I(J) = 0 
and 1\ * = n A<J>. 
JCT 
Consider a perturbed game in which trembles induce a belief ').. given m 
unless some type voluntarily uses m. For sufficiently small trembles, 
there exists an equilibrium to the perturbed game, with payoffs close 
* "' to u (t), in which R takes action r given m if and only if 'At 1\(J,r) 
for some J; the action r is not a best response to any beliefs 
obtained by "adding" combinations of t e J to ').. if and only if 
"' 'A 8 1\(J,r). As only S-types in J voluntarily use min an equilibrium 
* A in which they could obtain u (t) by not sending m, A(J,r) contains 
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exactly the beliefs that may cause instability if R takes action r 
given m. Thus, n A(J) is the set of trembles that cannot induce 
J#dCT 
voluntary action in any equilibrium. However, A<o> are those beliefs 
which give rise to actions attractive to some S types. This argument 
leads to our characterization theorem. 
Theorem 1. In generic signaling games, an equilibrium is stable if 
• and only if, for all unused signals m, A = o. 
5. EXTENSIONS 
While we confine our discussion in this chapter to signaling 
games, Propositions 1-3 hold for generic extensive-form games. Since 
these results combine to imply Theorems 1 and 2, we can use our 
techniques to rule out implausible sequential equilibria in more 
general extensive-form games. We suspect that divinity is easier to 
verify than stability and may be simpler to generalize to games with 
infinite strategy spaces. On the other hand, Theorem 3 and possible 
generalizations appear to be valuable only as a characterization of 
stable equilibria. 
We conclude by noting that our techniques do not refine the 
set of sequential equilibria in signaling games in which signals are 
costless. Specifically, let A(m), u(t,m,a), and v(t,m,a) be 
independent of m. These games are not generic, so we cannot apply our 
results directly. • However, it is easy to verify that r = A for any 
unused signal. This is because if t induces the action a e A with 
signal m', then there exist beliefs for which a is a best response to 
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the (unused) signal m. When signaling is costless, t is indifferent 
between sending m and m' and no other agent strictly prefers m to his 
equilibrium payoff. In addition, straightforward arguments show that 
stability does not restrict the set of equilibria, although this kind 
of game always has an equilibrium in which all types of S send the 
same signal and typically has other, more appealing, equilibria. 
Farre1111 (1984) and Myerson (1983) present ideas that apply to 
costless signaling games. Myerson presents an axiomatic solution that 
limits the outcomes in a mechanism-design problem that usually has a 
large number of sequential equilibria, but it is not clear that his 
ideas extend in a sensible way to a noncooperative framework. Farrell 
argues that an equilibrium outcome is not plausible if there exists an 
unused signal m, a nonempty set J, and an action r 8 BR(~,m) such that 
• J = {t: u (t) < u(t,m,r)}, where 
if t 8 J 
~(t) 
if t ~ J 
is the conditional probability of t given t 8 J. That is, Farrell 
argues that R should interpret a defection that benefits exactly the 
set J as evidence that exactly those t in J use m. Farrell calls an 
equilibrium in which this type of defection does not exist neologism 
proof. Neologism-proof equilibria do not exist in general, and, in 
games with costly signaling, need not be divine. 
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NOTES 
1. Kreps and Wilson (1982) prove Proposition 1. Kohlberg and Mertens 
(1984) prove Propositions 1-3. 
2. An equilibrium induces a probability distribution on the endpoints 
of the tree. An equilibrium probability distribution on endpoints is 
a probability distribution on endpoints induced by some equilibrium. 
3. If J = T, then no action R can take in response to the signal m 
induces S to send m. In this case, any beliefs are permissible. 
4. Kreps (1985) suggests a less restrictive version of this 
condition. Kreps discards an equilibrium in which there exists a 
sender type who would like to defect for every action in BR(AT\J'm). 
S. We represent examples with a bi-matrix B(m) for each m eM. There 
is one column in B(m) for each strategy in A(m) and one row for each 
type. The entry in the t-th row and the a-th column is (u(t,m,a), 
v(t,m,a)). In each of these examples, the qualitative properties that 
we discuss in the text remain valid if we perturb the entries in B(m). 
6. It does not change our results to require that R believes that any 
type who sends m instead of the equilibrium signal expects to benefit 
strictly by doing so. Thus, we can use a strong inequality in the 
definition of A0• 
1. Strictly speaking, Theorem 1 and Proposition 3 imply the existence 
of divine equilibria in generic signaling games. A limiting argument, 
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based on the upper hemi-continuity of divine equilibrium paths, 
establishes Theorem 2. Cho (1985) gives the details of a related 
argument. 
8. Harris and Raviv (1983) study a game in which there is a divine 
equilibrium that is not universally divine, hence not stable. Their 
comparative-statics analysis concentrates on the stable path. 
9. McLennan (1985) defines a refinement concept that is similar in 
spirit to this requirement. Specifically, call an action useless if 
it has a suboptimal payoff in every sequential equilibrium of a game 
(not just those equilibria in a stable component). McLennan shows 
that there exist sequential equilibria with beliefs restricted so 
that, at each information set, they assign positive probability only 
to nodes reached by the fewest useless actions. From this, McLennan 
recursively defines higher-order uselessness and arrives at a set of 
justifiable equilibria. In generic signaling games, only strongly 
dominated actions are useless, thus any divine equilibrium is 
justifiable. 
10. This condition is strictly more restrictive than universal 
divinity. In the game described in Figure 2, there is a sequential 
equilibrium in which both S types send m1 with probability one and R 
•• takes a3 given m2 • It is straightforward to check that f ; A. 
However, the message m2 is bad for t 2 • When R believes only t 1 would 
send m2 , R'a beat response given m2 is a1 • Therefore, the equilibrium 














11. Grossman and Perry's (1984) concept of perfect sequential 
equilibria is similar to Farrell's concept. However, Grossman and 
Perry analyze a particular game with costly signaling. 
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CHAPTER II. LIABILITY RULES AND PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The literature concerning the interaction of parties prior to 
and following the occurrence of an accident in which legal recourse to 
resolve financial liability exists currently lacks a fair degree of 
cohesion. Authors such as Brown (1973), Green (1976), Diamond 
(1974a,b), and Shavell (1983) have studied the effect on caretaking of 
various liability, or cost distribution, rules under the hypothesis 
that the goal of liability law is to create incentives for the 
efficient use of resources in the prevention of accidents [Posner 
(1972)] •1 This work has typically ignored the bargaining 
opportunities available to the injurer and victim in a civil suit 
prior to a court decision, assuming instead that the liability rule is 
enforced without alternative. Conversely, the work of Bebchuk (1984), 
Samuelson (1983), P'ng (1983, 1984), and Salant (1984) has focused on 
the proper modeling of the bargaining problem inherent in the legal 
process subsequent to an accident in the study of the strategic 
aspects of legal settlements, while avoiding the comparative analysis 
undertaken by Brown, Green, etc. This is quite understandable given 
the embryonic nature of bargaining theory and the analysis of 
strategic interaction of parties holding private and valuable 
information. However, explicitly incorporating the ability of injurer 
and victim to come to terms prior to trial identifies an area of 
generalization in regards to research into caretaking prior to an 
accident. Papers by Reinganum and Wilde (1985) and Sobel (1985) have 
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focused on the effect of alternative court cost allocation schemes and 
discovery rules in analyzing pretrial bargaining models with 
asymmetric information. Similar work in terms of liability rules 
seems justified. 
This paper is an initial step in such a direction. A model is 
developed which promotes the comparison of liability rules in regards 
to their influence on settlement decisions of injurers and victims in 
a civil suit. Though the model itself is somewhat simplistic, it 
seems to capture the leverage one or another party is granted in terms 
of pretrial bargaining by the liability rules as well as the 
differential behavior of negligent or nonnegligent parties. 
The paper is organized as follows: the following section 
presents a review of the aforementioned models of pretrial bargaining. 
Section 3 describes the model, the equilibrium concept to be employed, 
and characterizations of the four liability rules to be analyzed: 
negligence, strict liability with contributory negligence, negligence 
with contributory negligence, and strict liability with dual 
contributory negligence. 2 Section 4 describes the divine equilibria 
under the four liability rules and compares the conditions and the 
outcomes of these equilibria. Section 5 characterizes similar results 
for universally divine equilibria, and Section 6 concludes with some 
areas of further research. 
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2. REVIEW: PRETRIAL BARGAINING IN A CIVIL SUIT 
Early attempts to model decisions by plaintiffs and defendants 
over settlement vs. litigation typically revolved around single-person 
decision theory [Gould (1973), Posner (1973), Shavell (1982)]. As 
time progressed, analysts began viewing these decisions as part of a 
bargaining process between two possibly asymmetrically informed 
rational actors, and substituted game theory as the vehicle of 
analysis. Salant and Rest (1982), Salant (1984), and Reinganum and 
Wilde (1985) present models where the plaintiff has private 
information as to the level of damages incurred in the accident. The 
plaintiff makes some settlement demand, which the defendant either 
accepts or rejects, with rejection implying the litigants proceed to 
trial. In Salant and Rest (1982), however, the settlement demand is 
exogenously fixed; hence the ability of the plaintiff to signal his 
information is restricted, as is any analysis of equilibrium 
settlement demands. This restriction is lifted in Salant (1984), 
where the settlement demand is a function of the plaintiff's 
information. This information is assumed to take on two values (low 
and high), whereas Reinganum and Wilde (1985) generalize the model to 
allow for a continuum of possible damage levels, implying a continuum 
of plaintiff "types." They further examine the effects of different 
cost allocation systems on the equilibrium behavior of the litigants. 
Bebchuk (1984) develops a model where it is the defendant who 
possesses the private information, its nature being the probability of 
the plaintiff prevailing if they were to end up in court. The 
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plaintiff makes a settlement demand, after which the defendant either 
accepts or rejects the demand. Bebchuk solves for the unique 
sequential equilibrium; however, since the uninformed litigant moves 
first and only once, there is no possibility of information 
transmission. 
In P'ng's (1983) model, it is again the defendant who has the 
private information: either the defendant was negligent or not 
negligent in regard to the accident. The defendant makes the first-
and-final settlement offer, which the plaintiff can either accept or 
reject. However, as in Salant and Rest (1982), the settlement amount 
is fixed, implying the same shortcomings as in their analysis. 
Another shortcoming is that P'ng (1983) employs the Nash (as opposed 
to sequential) equilibrium concept, which allows nuisance suits to 
arise in equilibrium. Both of these problems are alleviated in P'ng 
(1984). This model is equivalent to the model below when the 
negligence liability rule is in force, although P'ng (1984) 
arbitrarily restricts attention to a subset of the sequential 
equilibria. 
Cooter, Marks, and Mnookin (1982) and Samuelson (1983) develop 
models where both plaintiff and defendant possess private information, 
but where the litigants make their settlement offers/demands 
simultaneously. If the plaintiff's demand is less than or equal to 
the defendant's offer, then they settle; if not, they go to trial. 
Unfortunately, the assumption of simultaneous moves disallows the 
ability to transmit and learn of private information. 
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Sobel (1985) describes a model where again both litigants have 
private information and where the focus of analysis is on the effect 
of disclosure rule on pretrial behavior. The sequence of moves is as 
follows: the defendant makes a settlement offer, which the plaintiff 
either accepts or rejects. If the latter, the defendant either 
discloses his information or not, according to the disclosure rule in 
place. The plaintiff subsequently makes a counteroffer, which the 
defendant either accepts or rejects. Sobel (1985) uses the 
universally divine equilibrium concept described in Chapter I above to 
obtain a unique equilibrium outcome under either disclosure rule. 
Finally, Spulber (1985) abandons the formal game-theoretic 
approach and instead analyzes a direct revelation game, the goal being 
"to avoid a priori restrictions on the information structure or on the 
strategy space of the negotiation game." The Revelation Principle 
allows Spulber to characterize the set of interim incentive efficient 
solutions to the game where both litigants have private information. 
It is unclear whether usage of the Revelation Principle for the 
underlying multi-stage ·process of offers and counteroffers is 
appropriate, and it is inconclusive whether all of the interim 
incentive efficient solutions can be generated as equilibria to any of 
the games described previously. 
3. THE MODEL 
Analysis of the settlement and liability issues is based on 
the following sequence of actions and events: an accident occurs 
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involving two parties, one of which incurs monetary damages m' > 0, 
which is assumed to be common knowledge. This party, called the 
plaintiff, costlessly initiates a legal suit against the other party, 
now called the defendant, to recover the damages. At issue in the 
case is the negligence or nonnegligence of both parties in terms of 
actions directly related to the occurrence of the accident. It is 
assumed that the negligence standard in use is common knowledge, but 
each party's negligence or nonnegligence is known only to that party. 
Given the state of his negligence the defendant makes a monetary offer 
me m+ to the plaintiff to drop the suit. If the plaintiff accepts 
the offer, the amount m is transferred from the defendant to the · 
plaintiff and the case is terminated. If the plaintiff rejects the 
offer, the parties proceed to court, where it is assumed that the 
court determines without error the negligence or nonnegligence of each 
party, and resolves the financial dispute. The monetary payoffs for 
the parties from the court decision are functions both of the 
negligence of each party as well as the liability rule in force, where 
it is assumed that both parties possess a priori knowledge of the 
liability rule. 
We model this interaction as a game of incomplete information 
where the plaintiff, p, can be one of two types, p1 (not negligent), 
or p2 (negligent). Let P = {p1 ,p2}. Similarly, the defendant, d, can 
be either d1 (not negligent) or d2 (negligent), where D = {d1 ,d2}. It 
is assumed that p1 occurs with probability y and d1 occurs with 
probability A, where the random variables pi and di are uncorrelated. 
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The set of pure strategies ford is the nonnegative real line~+; a 
strategy for d is a function 
q D ~ AJR , 
+ 
where AJR is the set of probability distributions on lR +" Thus 
+ 
q(mldi) is the probability that d offers m, given that his type is di. 
A pure strategy for p assigns an element of the set A= {a1 ,a2} for 
each possible offer, where 
a1 = accept d's offer, and 
a2 =reject d's offer. 
A strategy for p is a function 
where AA is the !-dimensional simplex describing probability 
distributions over (in this case) A. Thus r(ailm,pj) is the 
probability that p takes action ai, given that d has offered m, and 
p's type is pj. In general, we can describe the utility functions for 
d and pas u(di,pj,m,ak) and v(di,pj,m'ak), respectively" We extend 
these functions to the strategy space AA by taking expected values; 
let 
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Since d has no opportunity to gain information about p's type, we can 
suppress the pi term in d's utility function by redefining the 
function as: 
Also, for each p 8 An (i.e., probability distributions over D), 
m 8 m+, and pj 8 P, let 
be the best response correspondence for p, given his type. 
The utility payoffs for d and p are as follows: if p accepts 
an offer of m from d, then the payoffs ford and pare (-m,m- m'), 
respectively, regardless of p or d's type. If p rejects d's offer, 
both parties incur court costs (cp.cd > o. resp.) and the payoffs are 
determined by p and d's types and the liability rule, but not by d's 
offer. Each liability rule we analyze can be described by a 2 X 2 
matrix. constituting the four underlying states with entries of either 
0 or 1. where 0 implies that pis liable for the damages and 1 implies 
that d is liable. 
0 
1 
The payoffs for d and p, respectively. are: 
(-c -c - m') d' p 
(-cd- m',-cp>• 
Thus, if p is held liable, he receives no compensation from d, while 
still incurring the court costs, as does d. [We assume that the 
American system of allocating court costs is in force, where each 
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party pays his own costs irrespective of the court's decision.] 
Similarly, if d is held liable, he transfers m' to p, as well as 
paying his court costs (thus, we assume no punitive damages). The 
four liability rules we analyze are: 
1. Negligence3 
Under the negligence rule, the court's deci·sion is contingent only 
on d's type: i.e., whether or not p was negligent is not at 
issue. 
2. Strict liability with contributory negligence 
Under this rule, d's type is not at issue; d is assumed a priori 
(strictly) liable, but can use as a defense p's (contributory) 
negligence. 
3. Negligence with contributory negligence 
If d is negligent and p is not, then d is liable for damages; 
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otherwise p is liable. 
4. Strict liability with dual contributory negligence 
If p is negligent and d is not, then p is liable: otherwise d is 
liable. 
These rules constitute four of the six "noncomparative" 
liability rules studied by Brown (1973), noncomparative implying that 
the negligence of either party is not a function of the other party's 
actions. The two remaining rules, no liability and strict liability, 
can be analyzed as degenerate cases of the strict liability with 
contributory negligence rule, with prior probabilities r = 0 and 
y = 1, respectively. 
The generalization of the sequential equilibrium concept from 
Chapter I is readily apparent. 
Definition: A sequential equilibrium to any of the above games 
consists of strategies {q*(•),r*(•,•)} ford and p, and beliefs 
~<·lm> e A0 for p such that 
u(di,m',r*(m',•) = max u(di,m,r*(m,•)) 
melR + 
38 
where pr(di) = A, pr(d2) = 1 - A. 
Note that, although divinity and universal divinity were 
originally defined for signaling games; i.e., where p can be only one 
type, generalization to this model is saved from some difficulties by 
the fact that. under the negligence rule, payoffs are not a function 
of p's type (so we can without loss of generality assume only one type 
of plaintiff) whereas, in the other three liability rules at least one 
type of plaintiff has a dominant strategy, implying that such a type's 
best response correspondence is (subject to indifference) not a 
function of his beliefs. Thus, in using divinity to refine the set of 
sequential equilibria we will typically need to inspect the beliefs of 
only one type of plaintiff. 
4. DIVINE EQUILIBRIA 
4.1 Negligence 
Without loss of generality let 
r<·l·,p1) = r<·l ·,p2) = r<·l·).
5 For any offer m, the payoffs ford 
and p can be characterized by the following bi-matrix: 
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~I a1 a2 
dl I -m,m - m' -cd'-cp - m' 
d2 I -m,m - m' -c - m' -c d • p 
Define a(m) 
m' - m - c
0 = m' ; a(m) is the probability of ct 1 such that p 
is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer m. Define 
mA = (1 - ~)m' - cp; given beliefs A, p is indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting mA. Note that m~ L 0 <=> ~ ~ 
m' - c p 
m 
If 
mA > 0, Fig. 1 describes p's decision problem. Suppose that mA ~ cd; 
then both d1 and d2 would prefer to offer m e [mA,cd] and have it 
accepted, than to make any other offer and have it rejected. By Fig. 
1 if both d1 and d2 make an offer m 2 mA, p can (in equilibrium) 
accept. Thus, there exist sequential pooling equilibria 
m* e [max{O,mA},cd] of the form: 6 
q*(m*ld ) 1 = q*(m*ld ) 2 = 1, 
"' "' r*(a1 1m> = 1, Vm 2 m•, 




To check whether any of these pooling equilibria are divine, we use 
the following: given equilibrium payoffs u*(d1) at m• define 
r(a
1
1;> s. t. 
r(a1f;)(-m) + (1- r(a1fm))(-cd); 
similarly, define 
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Since the payoffs of d
1 
and d2 are increasing in r(·l ·), d1 would 
prefer to deviate if r<·l·> > e
1
, and d2 would prefer to deviate if 
r<·l·>> e2 • Recalling the conditions for divinity, 
e1 < e2 =9 ~(d 1 lm> z A, and vice versa. From Fig. 1 we see that, for 
equilibrium offers m• > mA and unsent offer me (mA,m•), p's beliefs 
must be such that ~(d1 1;> <A, in order to reject the offer;. 
Calculating e
1
(;1m•) and e2(;1m•) we get 
m' - m• + c d 
-





Thus, e1 , e2 S 1 =9 m! m•, and~ > 0, i = 1,2. Cancelling terms we am 
find that, for m ! m•, e1 S e2 , as in Fig. 2. 
Thus, divinity implies ~(d 1 1;> 2 A; but ~(d 1 1;> 2 A and;> mA 
-
imply p should accept m with probability one. Thus, the only divine 
pooling equilibrium offer is at 
m• = max{O,mA}. 
However, an offer of mA leaves p indifferent between acceptance and 
rejection, allowing p to mix between these two actions. Thus, a 
complete characterization of the equilibria is: 
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q*(mA.Idi) = 1, i = 1,2 ( 4 .1) 
r* (a1 1mA.) a 2. 
CQ + cd 
( 4.2) 
c + Am' + cd p 
a(cd - m ) 
r*(a1 1m < mA.) ~ 
A. ( 4.3) 
cd - m 
a(m' - mA. + cd) 
r*(a1 1m'- cp > m > mA.) ~ m' - m + c ( 4 .4) d 
( 4. 5) 
Since p will accept anY offer from d1 if p knew it was from 
ct1 , there does not exist a sequential separating equilibrium under the 
negligence rule. There does, however, exist sequential semi-pooling 
equilibria under certain conditions. It is easily shown that it is 
not possible to make both d
1 
and d2 indifferent between making two 
offers; hence the semi-pooling equilibria will consist of d2 mixing 
between two offers, d
1 
sending one of the offers (the "common" offer) 
with probability one, and p mixing between acceptance and rejection at 
the common offer. From Fig. 1 we see that p will accept with 
probability one an offer of m 2 m' - cp even if he knows its from d2; 
furthermore it must be that mA. 2. 0 for p to be indifferent between 
acceptance and rejection. Thus, if mA. 2 O, there exist sequential 
semi-pooling equilibria with common offer m• & [O,min{mA.,cd}]. At m•, 
d2 is indifferent between m• and m' - cp if r(a1 1m•) solves 
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Calculating through, we get 
= m' - m• + c • 
d 
( 5) 
r•(a1 lm•) is always positive, and 
m' - m• - c 
Since q*(m•ld1) = 1, to get a(m*) = m' 
0 • q*(m•ld2) must solve 
which implies 
m' - m• - c 
--------~P = --~----A~~~--
A + (1 - A)q*(m•ld
2
) ' m' 
q*(m•ld ) 
2 
A(m• + c ) 
(1- A)(m' - m•- cp) ( 6) 
Thus, the full description of the sequential semi-pooling equilibria 
q*(m' - c ld ) p 2 
A(m• + c ) 
(1- A)(m'- m•- cp) 
(1 - A)m' - m• - c 
(1- A)(m' - m• -






( 7. 5) 
(7.6) 
To check divinity, we can redefine ei(;lm•> in terms of the common 
offer m•. Thus, after solving for d1 •s equilibrium utility, e1 <;1m•) 
solves 






<;I m • > = -'-----==---<o=.---==-----
<cd- m)(m'- m• + cd) 
Since d2 •s utility is the same in all the semi-pooling equilibria, 
cp- m', e2<;1m•) is simply the equilibrium mix at m: 
c0 + cd e
2 
<;lm•> = -~---"'--
m' - m + cd 





ae1 = __ <_c~d_+_c~0:_>_<_cd:.:__-_m_•_> _ > 0, 
(cd - ;) 2(m' - m• + cd) am 
ae2 = __ <_c,~<.0 _+_c-"=d,_>_ 2 > o. 
am (m' - m + cd) 






Fig. 3 describes the situation. Thus, divinity requires that 
~(d 1 ) 2 A for m ~ m•, and ~(d 1 ) ~ A for m 2 m•. However, for m• ~ mA, 
A~ a(m*), so that divinity allows p to reject offers below the common 
offer. Thus, all the sequential semi-pooling equilibria are divine. 
To summarize the results under the negligence rule: 
(i) if mA ~ cd' there exists a divine pooling equilibrium offer at 
m• = max{O,mA}, which p accepts with positive probability. 
(ii) if mA 2 0, there exist divine semi-pooling equilibria with 
common offer m• e [O,min{mA,cd}], and where the probability of 
trial is 
(1 - A) A(m* + c ) l F-' - m• - c l 
(1- A)(m' - m•- cp) • lm' - m• + c: = 
3.2 Strict Liability with Contributory Negligence 
Am' 
m' - m• + cd 
Without loss of generality let q(•ld1> = q(·ld2) q ( • ) • 
Given an offer m, the payoffs to d and p are: 
~I al a2 
pl I -m,m - m' -cd - m' -c ' p 
p2 I -m,m - m' -cd'-cp - m' 
We see ,that both p1 and p2 have (weakly) dominant strategies: P1 
should reject all offers less than m' - c , and accept all offers p 
greater than or equal to m' - cp and p2 should accept any offer. 
Since the sequential equilibrium concept limits players to undominated 
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strategies off the equilibrium path, p1 and p2 cannot threaten to take 
any other action (e.g., it is not a sequential equilibrium if 
r<a1 1m,p2 ) < 1, for any m 8 m+). Thus in a sequential equilibrium, 
\/m, 
if m < m' - e p 
if m 2 m' - cp • 
(12.1) 
(12.2) 
For d, given r e (0,1), any offer m e (O,m' - ep) is dominated by 
offering m = 0, given p's equilibrium strategy; similarly 
m s (m' - ep,~> is dominated by offering m = m' - cp. Thus, in a 
sequential equilibrium, 
q*(m) > 0 =+ m 8 {O,m' - ep). 
Now, 
u(d,m = O,r*(·)) =-red- ym'; 
Let m 
r 
(1 - r)m' - ep. Thus, we get: 
(i) if red < mr, then q*(m = 0) = 1 
(ii) if red > mr' then q*(m = m' - ep) 




In words, if red < mr' then the unique sequential (hence divine) 
equilibrium is for d to offer m = 0, for p
1 
to reject and go to court, 
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and for P2 to accept and drop the case. If ycd > m1 , then the unique 
divine equilibrium involves d offering m = m' - cp. and both p1 and p2 
accepting . Note that if r = 0, (i) always holds; if p is always 
liable, then d should give p nothing (as in the case of "no 
liability") • If y = 1, ( ii) always holds. and d should offer m' - cp 
(as in the case of "strict liability"). 
4.3 Negligence with Contributory Negligence 
For an offer m from d, the payoffs to d and p are: 
p p1 
~I a1 a2 
dl I -m.m - m' -cd'-cp - m' 
d2 I -m.m - m' -cp - m' .-cp 
p = p2 
~I a1 a2 
dl I -m.m - m' -c -c -d' p m' 
d2 I -m,m - m' -c -c -p' p m' 
Note that the decision problem of p1 is similar to that of p under the 
negligence rule, while the decision problem of p2 is similar to that 
of P2 under the strict liability with contributory negligence rule . 
Thus. Fig. 1 characterized p1 •s problem, while p2 has a dominant 
strategy to accept any offer . 
As under the negligence rule, there exists a continuum of 
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pooling sequential equilibria under certain conditions. Here the 
condition is that mA ~ red' for d1 can guarantee himself (in expected 
value terms) red by sending m = 0 and having p1 reject and p2 accept. 
Formally, the equilibria are: 7 




( 13 .4) 
(13.5) 
negligence rule where, since p2 has a dominant strategy to accept any 
offer, Gi(;lm•) is the .Probability that p1 accepts m such that di is 
-





(1 - r)m - m• + red 




(1 - y)m - m• + y(cd + m') 
y(m' - m + cd) 
Ordering ~1 (·) and ~2 (•), we get, as under the negligence rule, 
(15) 
as in Fig. 2. Thus, the only divine pooling equilibrium offer which 
both p1 and p2 accept with positive probability is at m• = m~. There 
are, however, conditions under which another divine pooling 
equilibrium exists. Suppose that both d1 and d2 offer m = 0. If 
m~ > 0, then p1 will reject the offer (see Fig. 1), and p2 ~ill 
accept, giving d1 a utility of -red and d2 a utility of -y(cd + m'). 
If r(a1 Jm,p1) = 0, Vm < m'- cp' then the only deviation viable to d2 
is m = m' - cp, which both p1 and p2 will accept. Thus, the condition 
for m• = 0 to be a sequential pooling equilibrium is that 




Checking divinity, we get that 
(1 - y)m 
= , and 
y(cd - m) 
(16) 
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(1 - y)m 
y(m' - m• + c ) 
d 
cH~i 
Hence, g1<olo> = g2<olo> = o, ~ > o, i = 1,2, and g1 <·> > g2(·) am 
implying Fig. 4. Divinity implies that ~(d 1 1;> ~ ~. 
Vm e (O,r(m' + cd)), so that p1 can reject all offers less than 
m' - cp in a divine pooling equilibrium at m* = 0. 
(17) 
As in the negligence case there exists sequential semi-pooling 
equilibria in which d2 is indifferent between offers m* ~ m~ and 
m' - cp and mixes between them, and d1 sends m• with probability one. 
Recall that p2 has a dominant strategy: r•(a1 lm,p2) = 1, Vm, so that 
only p1-type plaintiffs mix between acceptance and rejection. For p1 
to be indifferent he must believe that d1 occurs with probability 
m' - m• - c p a(m*) = -----m-,----~. For d2 to be indifferent between m• and m' - cp 
it must be that r(a1 1m•,p1) solves 
so that 
(1- r><m•- m') +red+ cp 
r(m' - m* + cd) 
Now r•<a1 1m•,p1) ~ 1 implies m• ~ m' - cp, while r•<a1 1m•,p1) 2 0 
implies 
(1 - r>m' - red - c 
p -m• 2 ----( 1---r->.....::o..---J:. = m. 
( 18) 
( 19) 
Since (as in the negligence case) d2 can only make p1 indifferent for 
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offers less than mA.' a condition for the existence of sequential 
semi-pooling equilibria is that 
Also, it must be that m ~ ycd; otherwise d1 would be better off 
offering m = 0 and having p1 reject and p2 accept. 
Since P1 is indifferent at m• in the semi-pooling equilibrium 
and q*{m•ld1) = 1, q•{m•ld2) must solve 
m' - m• - c 
a( m•) = -----~P = ---:--___.....--:---:--- or 
m' A. + {1 - A.)q*{ •) ' 
A.{m• + c ) 
q*{m•ld2) = {1- A.){m' - m•- c ) ' 
p 
which is the same as under the negligence rule. 
{20) 
To check for divinity, we calculate &1 <;1m•) and &2 <;1m•). As 
under the negligence rule, 
-
{1- y)(m- m') + ycd + c
0 {21) 
y{m' - m + cd) 
which gives 
-
{1- y)[m{cd- m•)- m'{cd- m)] + {cd- m•){ycd + c
0
) 
y{cd- m){m'- m• + cd) 
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( 22) 
As a check, we see that, at m• = m, 
9 ( • ) 1 = 92 ( • ) ; also ( 23) 
a91 (cd- m•)(cd + c ) = p > 0, - 2 am r ( c d - m) ( m' - m• + cd) 
( 24) 
ae2 (cd + c0) > o. = 
am r<m' - m + cd)2 
Note that these partial derivatives are the same as in the 
semi-pooling equilibria under the negligence rule multiplied by 1/r. 
Thus, all the sequential semi-pooling equilibria under the rule of 
negligence with contributory negligence are divine. To summarize: 
(i) if mA ~ red' there exists a divine pooling equilibria at 
m• = max{O,mA}, where both p1 and p2 accept with positive 
probability; 
(ii) if mA > 0 and red ~ mr' there exists a divine pooling 
equilibria at m• = 0 where p1 rejects and p2 accepts; 
(iii) if mA > 0, m ~ mA, m ~ red' there exists semi-pooling divine 
equilibria with common offer m• s [m,min{mA,rcd}] and where the 
probability of trial is 
[ 
(1 - A) A(m• + c ) l 
A+ (1- ~)(m' - m• cp) [
r(m' - m• - c0 )l = Am' 
(m, m. + C m' - m• + cd r d 
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3.4 Strict Liability with Dual Contributory Negligence 
Given an offer m, the payoffs to d and p are: 
p p1 
~I a1 a2 
dl I -m,m - m' -cd - m' -c • p 
d2 I -m,m - m' -cd - m' -c • p 
p p2 
~I a1 a2 
dl I -m,m - m' -cd,-cp - m' 
d2 I -m,m - m' -c - m' -c d , p 
Thus the undominated strategies for p1 can be characterized as 
if m < m' - c p 




faces a decision problem similar to that of p in the 
negligence case (see Fig. 1). Again there exist sequential pooling 
equilibria m* 2 mA with the following constraints: 
(i) m* ~ cd + ym'; since p1 will reject any offer less than m' - cp' 
and in a pooling equilibrium p2 will typically reject all offers 
lower than the equilibrium offer; and 
(ii) m* ~ m; since both d1 and d2 obtain y(-cd- m') + (1- y)(-m•) 
in a pooling equilibrium at m*, it must be that d1 and d2 prefer 
this payoff to that which they would receive by offering 
m = m' - cp and having it accepted with probability one. Thus, 
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y(-cd- m') + (1- y)(-m•) 2 cp- m', which implies 
In terms of divinity, 
(1 - y)m' - yo - c 
--------------=0~ 
(1 - r> 
, while 
-- m. 
m' - m• + cd 
~2 <;1m•) = , so that, 




for m• < m, ~1 < ~2 and the only divine pooling equilibrium offer of 
this type is at m• = mA. 
Suppose now that m < mA, so that an equilibrium with the above 
conditions fails to exist. Hence both d
1 
and d2 prefer to offer 
m = m'- cp and have it accepted by p1 and p2 than to offer-m = mA and 
have it accepted only by p2 • Furthermore, if d1 (and hence d2) prefer 
to offer m = m' - c than m = 0 and having the offer rejected by both p 
P1 and p2 , it must be that 
y(-cd- m') + (1- y)(-cd) < cp- m', 
which implies 
Under these conditions there exists a divine pooling equilibrium at 
m• = m' - cp which p
1 
accepts and where p2 adopts the strategy 
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To check for divinity, we see that &
1
(;1m'- cp) solves 
cp- m' = y(-cd- m') + (1- y)[&1<;1m'- cp)(-;) 
+ (1- G <;lm' - c ))(-c )] 1 p d 
which implies 
cp- m' = y(-cd- m') + (1- y)[&2<;1m'- cp)(-;} 
+ (1- G (;lm' - c ))(-c - m')] 
2 p d 
which gives 
(1- y)(m'- m + cd) 
If &1 (•), &2(·) > 1, Vm, then divinity places no restrictions on 
beliefs. From the above equations we see that 
&1 <;1m'- cp) ~ 1 <=> m ~ m, 





so there does not exist an offer m such that di would prefer to send m 
under some mixed strategy by p2 while dj would never prefer to deviate 
A 
to m. Since divinity allows p2 to use the prior probability over D 
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when the issue is only the ordering of e1 and e2 , and since the prior 
supports p2 •s equilibrium strategy (see Fig. 1), the equilibrium is 
divine. 
The sequential semi-pooling equilibria in this case will 
involve p1 rejecting the common offer and accepting m = m' - cp, p2 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the common offer, d
1 
sending the common offer with probability one, and d2 indifferent 
between the common offer and m = m' - cp. Thus, d2 is indifferent at 
m• if r(a1 1m•,p2) solves 
cp- m' = y(-cd - ·m') + (1- y)[r(a1 1m•,p2><-m•) 
+ (1- r(a1 1m•,p2))(-cd- m')] 
or, 
(32.1) 
Now r•(·) > o, Vm•, while r•(·) ~ 1 <=> m• ~ m, so that m < 0 implies 
there does not exist any sequential semi-pooling equilibria. [Note: 
m ~ o <=> red 2 m1 .1 
As above, p2 is indifferent at m• if 
m' - m• - c 
g(d
1
lm•) = a(m•) • ---m-, --Z., so that 
).(m• + c ) 




Completing the equilibrium strategies, 
if m < m' - c p 
if m 2 m' - c p 
if m 'I= m•, m < m' - c p 
if m 'I= m•,m 2 m' - c p 
Checking divinity, e2 <;1m•) is simply p2 's equilibrium mix at m: 
c0 + cd e
2 
<;I m• > = -----"<----=---
(1- y)(m' - m + cd) 






<;I m* > = ----=--~--=------
<1- y)(cd- m)(m' - m• + cd) 
Note that for m• = m, e <. > 1 
ae1 = ______ <_c~d~+ __ c~p_>_<_cd=----m_•_> ____ __ 
- 2 
am (1- y)(cd- m) (m' - m• + cd) 
ae2 = ____ <_c~0 _+_c~d~> __ _ 2 > 0, 
am (1 - y) (m' - m + cd) 
> 0, 
which are the partial derivatives of e1 (•) and e2(·) under the 







sequential equilibria, with common offer m• & [O,min{m,m~,cd + ym'] 
are divine. In summary: 
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(i) if mAim, mA i cd + ym', and m > 0, there exists a divine 
pooling equilibria at m = mA which p1 rejects and p2 accepts; 
(ii) if mr < cd' there exists a divine pooling equilibria at 
m = m' - cp, which both p1 and p2 accept; 
(iii) if mAl 0 and m 2 0 there exist divine semi-pooling equilibria 
with common offer m• 8 [O,min{m,mA,cd + ym'}]. The probability 
of trial is 
[~ + (1 - A)A(m• + c ) l [ (1 - r> (m' - m•} - red - cpl ~ (1- A)(m' - m•- cp} • r + m' - m• + cd 
4.5 Summary 
The divine equilibrium paths under the four liability rules 
are: 
1. negligence 
(i} if mA i cd' there exists a pooling equilibrium offer at 
m• = max{O,mA}, which p accepts with positive probability; the 
Am' maximum probability of rejection is c + ~-· + ; 
P IW.I cd 
(ii} if mA l O, there exist semi-pooling equilibria with common 
offer m• 8 [O,min{m~,cd}], where p mixes between acceptance and 
rejection; the probability of rejection (hence a trial 
Alll' decision} at m• is , • + • m - m c 
d 
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2. strict liability with contributory negligence 
(i) if red < mr, the equilibrium offer by d is at m• = 0, which p1 
rejects and p2 accepts; thus the probability of trial is 
Pr(p
1
) = r; 
(ii) if red > mr' the equilibrium offer is at m• = m' - cp, which 
both p1 and p2 accept. 
3. negligence with contributory negligence 
(i) if m~ ~ red' there exists a pooling equilibrium offer at 
(ii) 
m• = max{O,m~}, which p2 accepts with probability one and p1 
accepts with positive probability. The maximum probability of 
rejection by p1 is 0 + ~· + ; P cd 
if m~ > 0 and rc < m , there exists a pooling equilibrium 
~ c r 
offer at m• = 0, which p1 rejects and p2 accepts; thus the 
probability of trial is Pr(p
1
) = r; 
(iii) if m~ ~ 0, m ~ m~, m ~ red, there exist semi-pooling equilibria 
with common offer m• e [m,min{m~,rcd}] which p2 accepts and p1 
mixes between acceptance and rejection; the probability of 
~· trial at m• is , • + • m - m cd 
4. strict liability with dual contributory negligence 
(i) if m~ ~ m and m~ ~ cd + ym', there exists a pooling equilibrium 
offer at m• = max{O,m~}, which p1 rejects and p2 accepts with 
positive probability; the probability of trial is at least 
Pr(p1) = r; 
(ii) if ffi ~ m~ and mr ~ cd' there exists a pooling equilibrium offer 
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at m* = m' - cp, which both p1 and p2 accept; 
(iii) if m 2 0, m~ 2 0, there exist semi-pooling equilibria with 
common offer m* e [O,min{m,m~,cd + ym'}], where the probability 
Am' of trial at m* is ---='-----
m' - m* + c • d 
Since red 2 m
1 
<=> m ~ 0, there exist comparisons between the divine 
equilibria of different liability rules in terms of the set of 
parameters for which the equilibria exist. The most interesting 
comparison seems to be negligence v. negligence with contributory 
negligence, and strict liability with contributory negligence v. 
strict liability with dual contributory negligence, which for 
notational simplicity we label n, non, slcn, sldcn, respectively. We 
begin by partitioning the space of parameters into two sets. 
A. m~ < 0 (i.e., ~ > 
m' - c p 
m, ) • 
(i) There exist no semi-pooling equilibria. 
(ii) If there exists a pooling equilibrium at m* = 0 under slcn, 
then there exists a pooling equilibrium at m* = 0 under sldcn; 
thus, the equilibrium m• = 0 exists "more often" (in terms of a 
probability distribution over parameter values) under sldcn 
than under slcn. 
(iii) If there exists a pooling equilibrium at m• = m' cp under 
sldcn, then there exists a pooling equilibrium at m• = m' - c p 
under slcn. 
(iv) The only equilibria under nand non is at m• = 0. 
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B. m~ 2 o. 
(i) The pooling equilibrium offer m• = m' - cp exists more often 
under sldcn than under slcn. 
(ii) The pooling equilibrium offer m• = 0 exists more often under 
slcn than under sldcn. 
(iii) The pooling equilibrium offer m• = m~ exists more often under n 
than under non. 
(iv) The pooling equilibrium offer m• = 0 exists more often under 
ncn than under n. 
(v) The semi-pooling equilibria exist more often under n than under 
non; more over, the set of common offers is smaller under ncn 
than under n. 
Thus we see that, given m~ 2 0, the pooling offers tend to be smaller 
going from n to non and slcn to sldcn, while with m~ < 0 there is no 
difference between n and non, and the pooling offers are on average 
larger under sldcn than under slcn. 
S. UNIVERSALLY DIVINE EQUILIBRIA 
Given the characterization of divine beliefs in Section 4, the 
further restriction to universally divine beliefs is easily stated. 
For all out-of-equilibrium messages m, if 
ei(;lm•) < ei<;lm•) and 
ei<mlm•> ~ 1, 
then universal divinity implies ~(dil;> = 1, where m• is the 
equilibrium offer. 
5.1 Negligence 
m' - c 





If ). < ).*, then there exists a divine equilibrium offer at m• = m).. 
To support this equilibrium, p1 and p2 must reject lower offers with a 
higher probability than in equilibrium. By Fig. 2, however, 
91 (;lm).) < 92 (;lm).), \/; < m).. Thus, universal divinity implies 
~(d1 1;> = 1, which implies acceptance, by Fig. 1. This then upsets 
the equilibrium. If, on the other hand, ). > ).*, then m• = 0; by Fig. 
2, this equilibrium will be universally divine. 
For the semi-pooling divine equilibria, which exist if ). < ).*, 
by Fig. 3 we see that, given a common offer m• e [O,m).], universal 
divinity again requires that ~(d1 1;> = 1, \/m < m•. Thus the only 
semi-pooling universally divine equilibrium is where the common offer 
is at m* = 0. 
Fig. 5 summarizes these results. 
5.2 Strict Liabiliti with Contributori Negligence 
m' - c 
Let r• = 
p 
Then m' + cd 
m ~ red as r• ~ y; also r 
fii ( 0 as r• ~ y. 
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Since both p1 and p2 have weakly dominant strategies, the 
restriction of universally divine beliefs will not alter the set of 
equilibria. Thus, if 1 < 1*• the unique universally divine 
equilibrium has d1 and d2 offering m• = 0, which p1 rejects and p2 
accepts. If 1 > 1*• then the unique universally divine equilibrium 
has d1 and d2 offering m• = m' - cp' which both p1 and p2 accept. See 
Fig. 6. 
5.3 Negligence with Contributory Negligence 
Recall that there exist two types of pooling equilibria in 
this case: (i) if mA < red' the pooled offer is at m• = max{O,mA}; 
(ii) if A < A* and 1 < r•. the pooled offer is at m• = 0. As in the 
negligence case above, if A < A*, then the type (i) equilibrium cannot 
be supported by universally divine beliefs; see Figs. 1 and 2. Thus, 
a type (i) equilibrium is universally divine only if A > A*, implying 
m• = 0, which both p1 and p2 accept. For a type (ii) equilibrium, we 
see that, by Fig. 4, universal divinity implies ~(d2 1;> = 1, 
Vm < m' - cp' thereby allowing p1 to reject all offers less than 
m' - cp. Thus, if A < A* and 1 < r•. there exists a universally 
divine equilibrium where d1 and d2 offer m• = 0, which p1 rejects and 
p2 accepts. 
The conditions for a semi-pooling divine equilibria are that 
~ < A*, m S mA, and m S 10d. By the arguments for the semi-pooling 
equilibria in the negligence case, we know that the lowest common 
offer is the only potentially universally divine equilibrium offer. 
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Thus m* = m would be the common offer. However, if m > 0, then by 
Fig. 3 we see that universal divinity implies ~(d 1 1;> 1, \/m < m*. 
Thus, by Fig. 1, both p1 and p2 would accept offers lower than m•, 
upsetting the equilibrium. The only instance where a semi-pooling 
universally divine equilibrium exists is when m ~ 0; i.e. r ) r•. 
implying m* = 0. Thus, the conditions for such an equilibrium are 
that A < A* and r > r*· Fig. 7 summarizes these results. 
5.4 Strict Liability with Dual Contributory Negligence 
Again there exists two types of pooling divine equilibria: 
(i) if mA ~ m, m > 0, and mA ~ cd + ym', then m* = max{O,mA}; (ii) if 
mr < cd' then m* = m' - cp. For type (i) equilibria, since 
G1<;1m*) < e2<iilm*), \/iii< m•, universal divinity implies ~(d 1 1;> = 1. 
Hence, p1 should accept these offers, upsetting the equilibrium. 
Thus, as above the only type (i) equilibrium which is universally 
divine exists when A > A* and r < r•. where m• = 0 and p1 rejects and 
p2 accepts. For type (ii) equilibria, we have 
m < m =9 e1<'iilm•) < e2(mlm•). and 
m > m =9 e1<iilm•) > e2<mlm•) > 1. 
When e1(•), e2(·) > 1, then universal divinity places no restrictions 
on beliefs. However, m < m implies ~(d1 1;) = 1; thus p2 should accept 
these offers. If m > o. then an offer of m = 0 would give d1 a 
utility of y(-cd- m'). To maintain the equilibrium, then, it must be 
that y(-cd- m') < cp- m', or equivalently mr ~red. But this is the 
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same as m ~ o. Thus, the only type (ii) equilibrium which is 
universally divine exists when y > r•. 
The conditions for a semi-pooling divine equilibrium are that 
A < A* and y < r•. Using again Figs. 1 and 3, we see that the only 
semi-pooling universally divine equilibrium is at m• = 0. Fig. 8 
summarizes these results. 
5.5 Summary 
As in Section 4 we compare the equilibrium predictions of 
negligence vs. negligence with contributory negligence, and strict 
liability with contributory negligence vs. strict liability with dual 
contributory negligence, where we again use the shorthand of n, ncn, 
slcn, and sldcn, respectively. Under universal divinity these 
comparisons are facilitated by the fact of unique of equilibrium 
predictions. Thus, we can compare the liability rules in terms of the 
preferences of the litigants. 
1. n vs. ncn. 
For A > A*, we see by Figs. 5 and 7 that the equilibrium 
predictions are equivalent. For A < A* and y > r•. it is easily seen 
that p1 and p2 achieve the same utility under both rules. Since d2 is 
mixing in these equilibria, it must be that d2 's utility is equal to 
m' - c p 
cp - m' under both rules. 
i.e., court costs times the probability of trial. Under ncn, p2 
accepts d1 's offer of m• = 0, while p1 rejects m• = 0 with probability 
65 
m' - c p 
y(m' + cd)• Since d1 faces p1 with probability y, d1 •s utility under 
m' - c p 
Thus, the only time utilities differ between n and non is when 
A < A* and r < r•. Under n, p1 receives utility 
Am' Am' 
m'- c (-m') + (l- m'- c )(-cp), 
p p 
while under non p1 receives utility -Am' - cp. Cancelling terms, we 
see that these two expressions are equal. Also, p2 •s utility under n 
is the same as p1 •s. Under non, p2 receives utility -m'. Since 
cp < m', p2 prefers a convex combination of -m' and -cp to-m' with 
certainty. Hence, p1 receives the same utility under n and non, and 
P2 prefers n to non. 
y(-cd). Working through the algebra, we see that, since r < r•. d1 
prefers non to n. Similarly for d2, since r < r•. 
y(-cd- m') > cp- m'; thus, d2 prefers non ton. 
2. slcn vs. sldcn. 
For r > y*, from Figs. 6 and 8 the equilibrium pr~dictions are 
equivalent. Furthermore, for A > A* and r < r• the predictions are 
also equivalent. Hence we again focus on A < A* and r < r•. Under 
slcn, p1 receives utility -cp, while under sldcn p1 receives -cp if 
the offer is m• = 0 and he rejects, and -cp if the offer is 
m• = m' - cp and he accepts. Thus, p1 is indifferent between slcn and 
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receives r<-cd- m') + m' + c (-cd). Thus, d1 prefers slcn to sldcn. 
d 
Under slcn, d2 also receives r<-cd- m'), while under sldcn d2 
receives cp- m', since d2 is indifferent and his mixing between 
m• = 0 and m• = m'- cp. Now r(-cd- m') > cp- m', since as above 
r < r•. Thus d2 also prefers slcn to sldcn. 
6. CONCLUSION 
We have seen how the liability rule in force can influence the 
behavior of plaintiff and defendant in the pretrial bargaining of a 
civil suit. A generalization of the model would be to allow the 
plaintiff the ability to make the first offer, which the defendant can 
either accept or make a counteroffer, and the plaintiff either 
accepting this or rejecting and going to court. This would allow the 
defendant the opportunity to gain insight into the plaintiff's type 
prior to making his offer, an opportunity which does not exist in the 
model above. Note that, if the defendant rejected a pooled offer from 
the plaintiff, the subsequent behavior would fall directly under the 
model of this paper; given a pooled offer by the plaintiff, the 
defendant gains no information; given that he's rejected the offer, he 
proceeds to make his own offer. 
In terms of analyzing behavior prior to an accident, notice 
that defendants prefer outcomes when ~ > ~·. so that for a fixed 
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damage size m', there is an incentive as a group to maintain a high 
prior probability of nonnegligence in the eyes of potential 
plaintiffs. Similarly, plaintiffs prefer outcomes when 1 > y*, so 
that there are incentives for (potential) pl~intiffs to maintain a 
high probability of nonnegligence as a group. Analysis such as this 
is fairly ad hoc, however; a more complete development will be the 
topic of subsequent papers. 
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NOTES 
1. Epstein (1973) posits an alternative goal of liability law, that 
of ncorrective justice.n 
2. Two other rules, no liability and strict liability, will be seen to 
be degenerate cases of strict liability with contributory negligence. 
3. P'ng's (1984) analysis basically deals with this rule. 
4. Of course, one could have initially defined equilibrium and 
subsequently added divinity; however, divinity grew out of the 
methodology of the sequential equilibrium concept and as such is 
easier to characterize as a refinement of sequential equilibrium. 
5. Since the payoffs are not a function of the plaintiff's type, the 
plaintiff's strategy can be a nontrivial function of type only if 
he is indifferent between a1 and a2 • In this case, the (mixed) 
strategies of the plaintiff below can be interpreted as those 
which arise after taking expectations over p1 and p2 • 
6. Some mixing between a1 and a2 is allowed out of equilibrium, as 
shown below; this does not alter the set of nondivine sequential 
equilibria. 
7. See note 6 above. 
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CHAPTER III. A MODEL OF ELECTORAL 
COMPETITION WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Modern attempts to model the competition between two 
candidates in an electoral setting have typically involved eliminating 
the restrictive assumptions inherent in the Downsian model. For 
instance, the Downsian model assumes that candidates and voters 
possess complete information concerning candidate positions and voter 
preferences. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1984, 1985) relax the former 
assumption by modeling a subset of the voters as uninformed about 
candidate positions, while Ledyard (1986) relaxes the latter by 
assuming that neither candidate knows precisely what the distribution 
of ideal points is. Another strong assumption implicit in the model 
of Downs is that the positions the candidates announce prior to an 
election will be the positions they subsequently enact once in office. 
Since the model assumes that voters have utility over the positions 
the candidates enact, not the position they announce, but their only 
information consists of these announcements, the tractability of the 
model may lead one to simply assume that what a candidate says he will 
do is in fact what he will do. 
This paper describes a model which attempts to remove this 
restriction. The model assumes that prior to an election each 
candidate knows what position he will adopt once in office, but the 
other candidate as well as the voters do not possess this information. 
The candidates simultaneously choose positions to announce, after 
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which voters attempt to infer from these announcements what they would 
actually do if elected. There are costs involved in announcing a 
position different from the actual position, these costs only accruing 
to the winning candidate. Thus, the winning candidate's true position 
is revealed after an election, since he implements his policy 
position, while the losing candidate's position is not revealed. The 
game is modelled as a game of incomplete information (Harsanyi (1967-
68)) and the sequential equilibrium concept (Kreps and Wilson (1982)) 
is used to describe equilibrium behavior. Given their beliefs over 
the candidates' true positions, the voters vote for the candidate 
giving them their highest expected utility. Similarly, given the 
strategies of the voters and the strategy of the other candidate along 
with the (common knowledge) prior over the other candidate's true 
position, the candidates choose to announce positions which maximize 
their expected utility. If furthermore the beliefs of the voters 
satisfy certain consistency criteria related to the strategies of the 
candidates, then an equilibrium is achieved. 
From the discussion above it is easily seen that the model 
involves two basic presumptions. The first is that the candidates' 
positions are known to them prior to the election; i.e., there is no 
room for a posteriori decisions on policy. This can possibly be 
justified by either assuming that candidates have policy as well as 
vote-maximizing preferences and, conditional on winning, would 
faithfully carry out these preferences, or by appealing to the 
characteristics of the party nomination process and the existence of 
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party control of its members. Suppose the political parties 
themselves have preferences over the policy space and through the 
nomination process choose the candidate most likely to carry out the 
party's preferred position given a favorable election outcome. 
Furthermore, the party allows the candidate to "win any way he can," 
that is, announce any position that will get him elected. If we treat 
the parties' preferences as exogenous and unknown, the model follows. 
The second presumption is that the candidate's utility, conditional on 
winning, is a decreasing function of the distance between his 
announced position and his actual position. Implicit in this 
formulation is a dynamic structure in which the winning candidate 
proceeds to enter another election, where his "reputation" for deceit 
is harmful to his chances (this interpretation of reputations in 
elections is slightly different than that found in Ingberman (1985)). 
Suppose that in this second election the candidate faces a new 
challenger on a new policy space, and where the voters discount the 
utility gained from the (previously victorious) candidate winning by 
some factor, an argument of which is such a distance. If this second 
election, and any subsequent elections, were explicitly in the model, 
the subgames they induce could be solved recursively for the utility 
payoffs of this first election. This is not done in the present 
paper; a functional form for the utilities is assumed incorporating 
what might be thought as this type of reputation effect. However, if 
the model developed below proves to be of value in describing behavior 
in elections, it may provide the groundwork for a more general model 
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of electoral dynamics and reputation formation. 
2. THE MODEL 
Consider a policy space P !; JR , a closed, convex interval, 
with IPI = D, where without loss generality we assume that the 
midpoint of P is at zero. -D D Thus, P = [~,2]. There are two 
candidates, A and B, whose "types," or true policy positions, are 
i.i.d. random variables with cumulative distribution F(·) and density 
f(•), where f(•) > 0 for all points in P and f(•) is .symmetric about 
zero. (Thus, f(•) is the common knowledge prior over both candidates' 
types.) A strategy for candidate A is a function 
where sA(a) is the announced position of candidate A whose type is 
a e P; sB(•) is similarly defined. There exists a finite set N 
{l, ••• ,n} of voters, n odd, where each voter i eN has a single-peaked 
utility function ui(•) over P; let pi be the ideal point of voter i. 
Assume that the median voter v e N has an ideal point equal to the 
midpoint of the policy space, i.e., p = 0. A strategy for voter i is v 
a function 
1 
ri : P X P ~ {0, 2' 1} 
where ri(pA,pB) is the probability that voter i votes for candidate A, 
given that i sees announced positions pA and Ps· Thus, voters either 
vote for A or B with probability one, or vote for A and B with 
probability one-half each. 
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Al. Utility of voters. Vi a N, the utility of policy position p is 
2 ui(p) =-(pi-p) • Thus, given beliefs gA(•) over candidate A, i's 
expected utility from A winning is given by 
- 2 
E u. =-(a- pi} g ~ 
2 - cra, 
where a is the mean and cr! the variance associated with the density 
A2. Utility of candidates. The utility of candidate A with type a, 
i iti ( ) i if ( ) ' n+l U( ) if g ven pos ons pA,pB , s zero vB pA,pB £ 2 , a,pA 
vA(pA,pB) 2 n;l, and is 
otherwise. The utility of candidate B is similarly defined, using 
U(b,pB}. The function U(•,•) is a continuous concave decreasing 
function of the distance between the arguments, so that 
\/(x,y) a P X P, where x F y, 
aU(x,y) ~ o as y ~ x, 
ax 
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au<x.Y) ~ ~ 
ay ~ o as x ~ y, 
U(y,y +e) = U(y,y- s), and 
U(x + s,x) = U(x- e,x). 
Also, for all x e P, we assume that there exists a (non-empty) region 
P(x) ~ P such that U(x,p) 1 0 iff p s P(x). [We allow U(•,•) to be 
non-differentiable at x = y so as to permit utility functions which 
are linear in d(x,y) = lx- yl.l 
Considering again the utility functions of the voters, note 
that for any beliefs gA(•) and g8(·) over candidate types, where 
a I b, there exists a unique position p e P defined by 
such that all voters with pi < p, should vote for one candidate, and 
all voters with pi > p should vote for the other candidate, if all 
voters have the same beliefs and behave in the optimizing manner 
described below. - 2 2 If a = b and oa = ab' then all voters are 
- - 2 2 indifferent between voting for A or B, while if a = b and aa I ob' all 
voters vote for the candidate with the lower variance. Now an 
implication of the consistency criterion inherent in the sequential 
equilibrium concept employed below is that all voters do hold the same 
beliefs, in ~ out of equilibrium. This is so because beliefs in a 
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sequential equilibrium are the limit of a sequence of beliefs derived 
using Bayes' rule on candidate strategies which take every position 
with some positive probability. Since this completely determines 
beliefs for every possible position, voters' beliefs are the same all 
along the sequence, and hence at its limit. Thus, given beliefs gA(•) 
and g8(•), if the median voter vis not indifferent between voting for 
A or B, then whoever v votes for would win the election. In what 
follows we will restrict indifferent voters in that we assume they 
vote for each candidate with probability one-half. Hence, if v is 
indifferent, and all other voters are not, then 
n-1 vA(•,•) = v8(•,•) =~·and by assumption each candidate wins with 
probability one-half. Finally if all voter are indifferent, the 
probability of being elected is again equal to one-half for each 
candidate, or equivalently is equal to the probability that v votes 
for them. Thus, the expected utility for candidate A, given positions 
while given a strategy s8 (•) and taking expectations over B-types A's 
utility is 
the expected utility for B is similarly defined. 
Def. A (perfect) sequential equilibrium to the above model consists 
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• • 11A<·I·>. lls<·l·>. such that 
i) Va e P, • sA(a) maximizes 
f 
• • 




• s8 (b) maximizes 
u ( b I SB (b)) f [ 1 -
p 
•-1 (relative to the prior f(•)) that a etA n sA (pA) given 
•-1 
a e sA (pA)' where tA ~ P; 
v) 
*-1 (relative to the prior f(•)) that be t 8 n s8 (pB) given 
*-1 be s8 (p8), where t 8 ~ P. 
Parts i) and ii) of the definition are self-explanatory. 
Part iii) says that, although voters have preferences over the winning 
candidate's position and they may be indifferent between voting for A 
or B in that they are not pivotal in the election, they always vote 
for the candidate giving them the highest expected utility, which is 
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their weakly dominant strategy. This is in the spirit of the 
perfectness criteria of Selten (1975), but is not captured in the 
sequential equilibrium concept. An equivalent way of getting this 
condition is to assume that the voters get some amount of utility from 
voting for their most preferred candidate, irregardless of the 
electoral outcome; this is used in McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985). 
Part iii) also implies that, for every pair of possible announcements 
(pA,pB) by the candidates, the voters form~ beliefs over candidate 
types and maximize their utility according to these beliefs; thus, 
voters cannot threaten to take an action which is strictly dominated 
by some other action, since a dominated action is a best response to 
no beliefs. Also, all voters hold the same beliefs about the 
candidates in and out of equilibrium, as discussed above. Finally, 
parts iv) and v) imply that voters use Bayes' rule to update their 
beliefs on candidate types by their knowledge of the equilibrium 
strategies of the candidates. Thus, if only one type of candidate A 
makes a particular announcement, then if the voters see that 
announcement they must ,believe it is that type of candidate with 
probability one; if a subset of types make the same announcement the 
voters assign positive probability only to those types in the subset, 
and use the prior to deduce the posterior probability distribution. 
3. SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIA 
In what follows we will look only at equilibria which are 
symmetric with respect to the candidates (i.e., a= b => 
sA(a) = sB(b)), thus allowing us to drop the subscript on candidate 
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strategies and w.l.o.g. focus on candidate A. Furthermore, for the 
non-(pure)pooling equilibria we will examine equilibria which are 
symmetric with respect to the origin (i.e., s(a) = -s(-a)), implying 
D we can concentrate on the half-policy space [0,2]. 
One feature of all symmetric equilibria in the model is that 
the equilibrium strategy s(•) is monotone increasing; i.e. 
I D I I 
Va,a e [0,2],a <a implies s(a) ~ s(a ). To see this, fix an 
equilibrium and let ~(a) be the probability that an a-type candidate 
wins the election, where we suppress the other arguments of this 
function. In equilibrium it must be that no type is better off 
emulating another type; thus Va, 
I I I 
~(a) U(a,s(a)) 2 ~(a) U(a,s(a )), Va. (1) 
Suppose that s(•) is not monotone increasing, so that a <a but 
I 





~(a ) U(a,s(a)) 
( 2) 
and differentiating the right hand side of (2) with respect to a, 
I 
holding s(a) and s(a ) fixed, gives 
, 
aU<a.s(a )) • U(a,s(a)) - aU(aa,sa(a)) • U(a,s(a,)) 
iL:l _ ----~aa~--------------------~-~--------------
aa - [U(a, s(a)) l 2 
(3) 
The denominator is positive, while the numerator is negative since 
I 
I aU(a,S(a )) au<a S(a)) 
U(a,s(a)) > U(a,s(a ) ) and aa < aa < O. Thus, the 
, 
RHS of (2) decreases as a increases. But this implies that, at a , 
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, , , , 
~(a) U(a ,s(a)) >~(a) U(a, s(a )). Thus, a would prefer to send 
, 
s(a) than s(a ), thereby contradicting the assumption that s(•) is an 
r I 
equilibrium strategy. The arguments for the cases s(a) > s(a ) > a 
I 
and s(a) > a, s(a ) < a are analogous. 
Since all equilibrium strategies are monotonic, any 
discontinuities will be jump discontinuities. Furthermore, it is 
easily seen that an equilibrium strategy must have a jump 
discontinuity when going from a "pooled" position; i.e. a position 
taken by more than one type, to a separating position, where each type 
takes a unique position. D Suppose that there exists a type a e [0,2] 
and numbers e1 , e2 > 0 such that all a' 8 [a-e1 ,a> take the same 
position and all a 8 [a,a + 8 2] take a unique position. Letting~(·) 
again denote the equilibrium probability of election, there must be a 
jump discontinuity at A(a). By the continuity of U(•,•), it also must 
be the case that a must be indifferent between pooling with [a- e1 ,a) 
and separating. But to be indifferent with a jump discontinuity in 
A(•) it must be that s(•) has a jump discontinuity at a as well, thus 
proving the claim. In what follows we will examine four kinds of 
equilibria: 1) pooling equilibria, where all types take the same 
position, 2) semi-pooling equilibria, where subsets of types take the 
same position, 3) separating equilibria, where each type takes a 
unique position, and 4) hybrid equilibria, where some types separate, 
while other types pool. Since the hybrid equilibria allow for any 
combination of the first three types, this categorization will exhaust 
the possibilities for the sequential equilibrium of the model. In 
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each case, we will look at conditions under which these equilibria 
exist, and whether or not they satisfy the restrictions on off-the-
equilibrium-path beliefs set forth in Chapter I above. In particular, 
we will attempt to characterize the universally divine equilibria for 
each case. 
3.1 POOLING EQUILIBRIA 
It is easy to see that a pooling equilibria will exist only if 
there exists a position p e P such that U(a,p) 2 O, Va. Furthermore, 
if such a position exists, then beliefs of the form 
~<¥1m> 1 if m > p 
~<-¥1m> = 1 if m < p 
will support the equilibrium. This is so because, given a pooled 
position, voter v simply uses the prior f(·) as his beliefs which, 
given the symmetry of f(•), gives a mean of zero 
The out-of-equilibrium beliefs above give a mean 
and a variance a~. 
of Q (or _Q) and a 
2 2 
variance of zero. Hence, given the voters' quadratic utility 
D functions and the fact that af < 2• for any out-of-equilibrium message 
by a voter v would respond by voting for B with probability one. 
Thus, the equilibrium is maintained. 
To see whether or not these beliefs are reasonable, we 
calculate (as in Chapter II) the probability of voting for A which 
makes a given type indifferent between sending the equilibrium 
position or defecting. 1 Since equilibrium utility is 2U(a,p), define 
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9(a,mlp> - lU(a,p) 
- 2U(a,m) ( 4) 
as the value making an a-type indifferent between sending p and m; any 
value higher than this would lead to defection. For each m, we want 
to calculate the type who is most likely to defect, i.e., the type 
which minimizes 9(a,mlp). Note that we need only look at types for 
which U(a,m) > 0, since otherwise the type would never defect and send 
m. Fix m > p. Differentiating (l) with respect to a gives 
[
aU(a,p) aU(a,m) ] 
aa(a,mlp) 1 !!a • U(a,m) - aa • U(a , p) 
aa =2 [U(a,m)]2 
The denominator is always positive, by assumption. We examine the 
sign of (2) in 3 regions: 




!!U(a,p) < !!U(a,m) < 0 and aa aa , 
0 < U(a,p) < U(a,m); 
aa<a.mlp> 
aa < 0 • 
a e ( P, m) • Then 
au~a.p) < 0 < au<a.m) a a a a 
thus, aa~a.mlp) < o. a a 
a < P < m. Then 
0 < au~a.p2 < au~a.m) a a aa , 




thus, ae<a.mlp) aa < o. 
(Although 9(a,mlp) is continuous in a, it may not be differentiable at 
a= p or a= m.) Thus, form> p, ~ = argmin 9(a,mlp). Similarly, 
a 
D form< p, -2 = argmin 9(a,mlp). Hence, all pooling equilibria are 
a 
universally divine. 
3.2 SEMI-POOLING EQUILIBRIA 
The semi-pooling equilibria we examine are characterized as 
follows: 
Va e ( -al, al) , s(a) = 0 a ao; 
Va e [al,a2), s(a) = al; 
Va e ( -a2 ,-al 1 , s(a) = -al; 
Va e [a2, a3) , s(a) = a2, etc. 
See Figure 1. Those types sending a0 will win the election with 
probability 2(1- F(a1)) + F(a1)- F(a0), or equivalently 
2- F(a0)- F(a1). In general, if a e (ai,ai+l), then a wins with 
probability 2- F(ai)- F(ai+l), giving an equilibrium expected 
utility of 
( 6) 
It is assumed that a1 is indifferent between sending a0 and a1 ; thus, 
a1 solves 
U(a1 ,a0) 
U(a1 , a1) 
= 
2 - F(a1 ) - F(a2> 
2 - F(a0 ) - F(a1> 
( 7) 
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thus a1 is a function of a2 • In general, ai solves 
2 - F(ai) - F(ai+l) 
2 - F(ai) - F(ai_1 ) 
( 8) 
If there are l - 1 such points on [0,¥] in equilibrium, then (5) gives 
l - 1 equations in l unknowns. D The final equation is given by a1 = 2· 
It is easy to see that, if a = ai is indifferent between sending 
ai-l and ai' then all types a e (ai-l'ai) prefer to send ai-l' and all 
types a e (ai,ai+l) prefer to send ai' thus assuring an equilibrium 
considering only those positions sent with positive probability. For 




1 if m > 0 
1 if m < 0 
will support the equilibrium. 
To examine out-of-equilibrium beliefs, we look at &(a,mfs(a)) 
as in 3.1, although the probability of winning now differs across 
subsets of types sending different positions. However, given the 
equalities in (5), 9(a,mfs(a)) will still be continuous, although 
non-differentiable at a0 ,a1 ,a2 , ••• a1• Furthermore, since the 
probability of winning is not a function of type except at these 
points, we can ignore this term in signing aa<a·:!s(a)), thus giving 
the form found in (2), replacing p with s(a). 
Suppose me(ai-l'ai), m > 0. We examine at four regions: 
i) a< ai-l' Then 
0 
U(a,m) 
thus, ae(almls(a}} a a 












thus, ae(a~ ml s (aU a a 
a > ai. Then 
0 
U(a,s(a)) 
thus, ae(almls(a}} a a 
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< au(a~sl < a a 
< U(a,s(a)); 
< o. 




< CJU(a~ml < 0, and a a 
< U(a,m); 
< o. 





Figure 2 describes the situation. Thus, universal divinity 
implies that, for all me (ai-l'ai), ~(ailm> = 1. With this belief, A 
defeats B with probability 2(1- F(ai)). As m => ai' 
e(a,mlai) => 2- F(ai)- F(ai+l). But 2(1- F(ai)) > 
2- F(ai)- F(ai+1 >. Thus, form sufficiently close to ai' ai would 
want to send m as opposed to ai, thereby upsetting the equilibrium. 
Hence, the semi-pooling equilibria described above are not universally 
divine. 
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3.3 SEPARATING EQUILIBRIA 
The strategy s(·) is part of a separating equilibrium only if 
s(·) is one-one; we will also assume that it is continuous. In a 
separating equilibrium, the payoffs to each type are 
2(1- F(a))U(a,s(a)). An equilibrium condition is that no type is 
better off emulating another type. Thus, \Ia, 
2(1- F(a))U(a,s(a)) 2. 2(1- F(a'))U(a,s(a')), \Ia'. (9) 
Three conditions of a separating equilibrium are immediately apparent: 
1) s(a) ~ a, \Ia. 
If not, let a' = s(a) > a, for some a; then a' is better off sending 
s(a) than s(a'), since a' receives a higher utility upon winning and a 
higher probability of winning, thus contradicting the assumption of an 
equilibrium. 
2) as aa > o, \Ia. 
If not, then there exists a,a' > 0 such that a >a' and s(a) < s(a'); 
by 1) then, s(a) < s(a') ~a' <a; thus a is better off sending s(a'): 
contradiction. 
3) s(~) is such that U(~,s(~)) = 0. 
Note that, if ~ separates, then he wins with probability zero. If 
D D 3 D D U(2,s<2>> > 0, then 2 1 > 0 such that U(2,s(2) - 2 1) > 0 by the 
-1 D continuity of U(•,•); but the probability that s (s(2) - 21) wins is 
strictly positive. Thus,~ is better off sending s(~) - 2 1• If 
D D 3 D U(2,s<2>> < 0, then 2 2 > 0 such that the probability that 2- 2 2 
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D D wins is strictly positive, but 0(2- 8 2,s(2- 82)) < 0, by the 
continuity of s(•) and U(•,•). Thus, ¥- a2 is better off sending 
D s<2>· Contradiction. 
Equation (7) holds with equality at a' = a; 'thus a (first-order) 
necessary condition for an equilibrium is that 
a!,[2(1- F(a'))U(a,s(a'))]la'=a = 0, or 
-f(a)U(a s(a)) + aU(a,s(a)) ~(1- F(a)) = 0. (10) , as aa 
The strategy s( ·) must also satisfy the second-order condition 
2 
-f'(a)U(a,s(a)) - 2f(a)aU(a,s) ~+a U(a,s) ~(1- F(a)) 
as aa as2 aa 
2 
+ au~A,s) a s<a>( 1 F(a)) < o. 
s aa2 
( 11) 
Equation (10) gives a first-order differential equation, while 
condition 3) above gives a value restriction. However, condition 1) 
implies that we must also have· s(O) = 0. Thus, we have two value 
restrictions on a first-order differential equation, implying the 
generic non-existence of a solution. However, we incorporate the 
above mathematics in the following case. 
3.4 HYBRID EQUILIBRIA 
The hybrid equilibria we examine are of two configurations: 
CI, where types toward the midpoint of the policy space separate, and 
those towards the extremes pool, and CII' where the extreme types 
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separate and the others pool. Figures 3 and 4 give examples of what 
the equilibria might look like. For both c1 and c11 , we assume that 
there exists a type, a1 and a11 , respectively, who is indifferent 
between separating and pooling. By the results in 3.2 above, we need 
only consider one pooling position per half-policy space in attempting 
to characterize the universally divine equilibrium, since more than 
one would imply (as above) that some type would want to defect from 
the equilibrium when we restrict beliefs. 
Cl 
Given a separating position s(a1), a1 is indifferent between pooling 




= 2 . (12) 
To assure an equilibrium it must be that differentiating the LHS of 
(12) with respect to th~ first argument in U(•,•) is nonpositive: 
aU(a,s(a1)) aU(a,a1> 
aa • U(a,a1> - aa • U(a,s<a1>> i o. (13) 
But 
aU(a,s(a1)) oU(a,a1 > 
aa < aa < o, and 
U(a,s(a1)) < U(a,a1), 
so that (13) holds. Thus, if a1 is indifferent between sending s<a1) 
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and a1, all types a > a1 strictly prefer to send a1 • 
For m > a1 , it is obvious that universal divinity implies 





have the following: 
O(a,mls(a)) = 2(1 - F(a)) U(a,s(a)) 
U(a,m) 
Differentiating (14) and ignoring the denominator, we get 
( 14) 
aa<a·:!s(a)) = 2 [-f(a)U(a,s(a)) + (au<a~,s) + au<a~,s) • a~~a>] (1 _ F(a))] 
X U(a,m) - 2aU(a,m)(1- F(a))U(a,s(a)) • (15) a a 
By equation (10) however, this simplifies to 
aa(a,mJs(a)) = 2(1 - F(a)) [aU(a,s) • U(a,m) - aU(a,m) • U(a,s(a) >]<16) 
aa aa aa 
Two regions are of interest: 
i) a > m > s (a). Then 
au~a.sl < au~a.ml < 0, and a a a a 
U(a,s(a)) < U(a,m); 
thus, ae~a.mls~all < o. a a 
ii) m >a> s(a). Then 
au~a,sl < 0 < au~a.ml. a a a a , 
thus, ae~a.mls ~an < o. a a 
for a > a1, we have 
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(1 - F(a1 ))U(a,a1 > 
U(a,m) 
Differentiating with respect to a gi~es 
Then, 
[
aU(a,a1 ) · = (1- F(a1)) aa • U(a,m) 
au<a.m) l aa • U(a,ai) 
aU(a,ai) aU(a,m) 
o > aa > aa and 
U(a,a1) > U(a,m); 
(17) 
( 18) 
thus, :: > 0. See Figure 5. Hence, universal divinity implies that, 
V m s <s<a1 >,a1 > ~Ca1 1m> = 1. Thus, as in the semi-pooling 
equilibria above, if a sends m, then a wins with probability 
2(1- F(a1 )), while as m -) a1 , 9(a,mla1> ~ 1- F(a1 >. implying in 
particular that a1 would defect from the equilibrium. Since 
a1 ~ s(a1 > by (12), there exist such out-of-equilibrium positions. 
Hence, no c1 equilibria are universally divine. 
CII 
Given a separating position s(a11>, a1 is indifferent between pooling 




To assure an equilibrium differentiating the LHS of (20) with respect 
to the first argument in U(•,•) must be positive (again ignoring the 
de nomina tor) : 
au(a,s<arr>> au(a,m} 
aa • U(a,m) - aa • U(a,s(a11 >) > o. (21) 
i} o <a< m < s<a11>. Then 
au(a,;~arr>> > au~~~m> > o, and 
U(a,m) > U(a,s(a11>>. 
ii) m <a< s(a11>. Then · 
au(a,slarr> au<a.m) 
aa > 0 > aa 
Thus, (21) holds. If a11 is indifferent between sending a0 and 
D s(a11>, then all types a 8 (a0 ,a11> prefer to send a0 • Form> s<2>• 
it is easy to see that universal divinity implies ~<~lm> = 1, thus 
supporting the equilibrium. Form 8 (a0 ,s<a11 >> we have the 
following: 
Let a > a11; then 
9(a,mls(a)) = 2(1- F(a)}U(a,s(a)) U(a,m) ( 22) 
Differentiating with respect to a, substituting in (10) and ignoring 
the denominator gives 
ae(a,mls(a)) = 2(1 _ F(a}}[aU(a.s} • U(a,m) _ aU(a,m} • U(a,s>] ( 23 } aa aa aa 





0 > au~a.s} > au~a.m} and a a a a 
U(a,s) > U(a,m); 
thus, c39~a.mls~a}} > 0. a a 
a > m >a0 • Then 
thus, 




[2- F(arr> 1 U(a,m) 
au(a,a0> < au~a.m} < 0, and a a a a 
U(a,a
0
) < U(a,m); 
c39(a,mla0) < o. a a 
c3U(a,a0> < 0 < au~a.m}. a a 
c39(a,mla0> ------"'- < 0. a a 
a a ~ 
( 24) 
(25) 
Thus, replacing a1 with a11 in Figure 5 we get the equivalent sketch 
of 9(a,ml·> for c11• Universal divinity thus implies that, 
V me <a0 ,s<a11>>, ~<a11 1m> = 1. Any type sending m would win with 
probability 2(1- F(a11 >>. For the c11 equilibria to be universally 
divine, it must be that 
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or 
2(1- F(a11>> ~ inf [ mian 9(a,ml·>j • 
me(a0 ,s(aii)) 
(27) 
By the arguments above, a11 minimizes the term in brackets. Since 
(22) and (24) are equal for a = a11 for all m (by the definition of 
a11>, we can substitute in either into (27). Thus, using (22), 
2( - F<a11>> i inf me(a0 ,s<a11>> 
2(1- F(a11>>U<a11,s<a11 >> 
U(a,m) (28) 
Since s(a11> i a11, U(a11 ,s<a11 >> > U(a,m), V m < s(a11>; thus (28) 
holds with strict inequality, since (dividing through by 
2(1- F(a11)), the LHS of (28) equals one, while the RHS is greater 
than or equal to one. Hence, all c11 equilibria are universally 
divine. 
A c11 equilibria exists if there exists a type a > 0 such that 
·equation (20) holds, where s(•) satisfies (10) as well as the value 
restriction U(~,s(~)) = 0, and the constraint 0 i s(a) i a. Note that 
if the value restriction cannot be met, then there exist pooling 
equilibria but no c11 equilibria; if the restriction can be met, then 
there exist c11 equilibria but no pooling equilibria. 
To see whether a solution to (20) exists, let 
h(a,s) = U(a,s(a)) U(a,O} 
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g(a) = 2- 2F(a)' 
l - F(a) 
2 
Then, 
[aU(a,s) + oU(a.s) as] U( O) oU(a,O) • U(a,s) ah(a.s) = ~~a~a ______ ~as~--a~a~ ___ a_, ______ ~a~a~---------
aa [U(a,O)J2 
, ( 29) 
= 
-f(a)[2- F(a)] + 2f(a)[t- F(a)] 
[2 - 2F(a)] 2 
(30) 
Working through the algebra, we see that w.s.l > 0 g(a) w.s.l --) .., aa , t aa 
as a --) ll
2
, and ah(a,s) > o for a < a', h(a,s), oh(a.s) --)..,as 
aa aa 
a --) a', where a' solves U(a,O) = 0. Furthermore, g(O) = 1, and 
h(s-1(0),s) = 1. Thus, if s-1(0) ~ 0 and h(a,s) is convex, then 
h(a,s) and g(a) cross at exactly one point. See Figure 6. 
To get some idea of how this c11 equilibrium changes as one 
varies the utility functions of the candidates, let the co_nstant k 
measure the degree of concavity of the functions; that is, as k 
increases, the utility functions become narrower, shrinking the sets 
P(a) defined above. One can think of k as a measure of the costs 
involved in deviating (after elected) from an announced position. 
Furthermore, assume that the separating strategy is a continuously 
differentiable function of k. 
Rewrite (20) as 
2(1- F(a))U(a,s(a;k);k) - <f- F(a))U(a,O;k) = 0. (31) 
Thus, a11 which solves (31) will be a function of k. To calculate 
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a a II 
ok , note first that by the envelope theorem, the derivative of (31) 
with respect to k when a is replaced by a
11
(k) is zero. Applying the 
chain rule then, 
a r • 1 /ak 
cH • 1 /a a ' 
where [•] is the LHS of (31). The denominator of (32) is by (10), 
(32) 
~ = 2(1 - F(a))aU(a,s) + f(a)U(a,O) - <~2 - F(a))au<a~,o>, (33) aa aa 
which is positive since 0 > aU(a,s) > aU(a,O) and (l- F(a)) > 
aa aa 2 
2(1 - F(a)) > o. The numerator of (32) is 
£i:l = 2 (1 _ F(a))[aU(a,s) as+ aU(a,s)] -(l _ F(a))aU(a,O) (34) ak as ak aa 2 ak • 
Since 0 > aU(a,s) > aU(a,O) by assumption 
ak ak ' 
2(1 - F(a))au<a~,s> - <t- F(a))au<a~,o> > o. Thus, if :~ > o, then 
a a II 
the numerator of (32) will be positive, thus giving ~ < 0. Hence, 
as the costs increase, the set of separating types increases, while 
the set of pooling types decreases. This continues until s-1 (0) = O; 
i.e., a11(k) = 0. 
Note that if s-1(0) = (0), so that we have a separating 
equilibrium, and U( •, •) is strictly concave with au<a"a' s) ·= 0 at a = s, 
then equation (10) is going to hold at values arbitrarily close to 
a = 0 only if k = ~. Thus, in this case, the limit of the c11 
equilibria k ~ ~ is the separating equilibrium. 
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To get an idea about the sign of ~~· differentiating (10) with 
respect to k, where s(a) is replaced with s(a;k), and applying the 
envelope theorem implies 
au [~as + au n_l f(a)ak- (1 - F(a)) akas aa as akaa 
2 
-f(a)au + (1- F(a))a:Q as 
as as2 aa 
( 35) 
The denominator of (35) is negative, as is all but the last term in 
the numerator. Hence, a sufficient condition for :~ > 0 is that 
~ akaa > 0. Assuming that s(a;k) is continuously differentiable, we can 
rewrite (35) as 
~[as 1 +as a(a) = p(a), da ak ak ( 36) 
where 
2 
f(a)au (1 - F(a)) .a:.!! as -
as2 aa as 
a(a) = and au (1 - F(a)) as 
f(a) au- (1 - F(a)) has 
~(a) 
ak akas aa 
= 
au (1 - F(a>>as 
Equation (36) is a first-order linear differential equation in ~~· 
which has as a solution 
~~ = e-Ja(a)da [ J (eJa(a)da _ ~(a))da + q), (37) 
where q is a constant. Thus, :~ is positive if and only if the 
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bracketed term in (37) is positive. Given the complicated expressions 
a(a) and ~(a), this is yet to be computed. 
In summary, universal divinity implies the following: suppose 
a = 0 pools with other types. Increasing from a = 0, universal 
D divinity restricts the equilibrium strategy to pooling out to a = 2• 
or jumping to a separating segment, but not jumping to another pooling 
segment. Once separating, universal divinity restricts the 
D * equilibrium strategy to separating out to a = 2· Hence, if k ~ k , 
where k* solves U(¥,0;k) = 0, then the only universally divine 
equilibria are pooling equilibria, restricted to some interval about 
• the median. If k > k , then the only equilibria are CII hybrid 
equil. ibria, which will be unique for each value k. If au<a.s) = 0 at a a 
a = s, then as k approaches ~ the hybrid equilibria approach the 
separating equilibrium. If, as is assumed in the following section, 
U(•,•) is linear in distance, then there will exist a value k < ~ 
which supports the separating equilibrium characterized by equation 
(10). For values above k, it is easily seen that the strategy defined 
, , 
by (10) would have s(a ) =a , for some a > 0 and s(a) > a for all 
, 
a < a , which won't be an equilibrium. However, there is a separating 
, . 
equilibrium defined as s (a) = a, V a ~ a , and s (a) = s (a), 
, . 
V a> a , where s (a) solves (10). Thus, in the linear case, types 
continue to separate for parameter values above k, where the 
separating strategy is now "kinked" and follows the 45° line for 
, 
values less than a • 
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4. EXAMPLES OF SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOR 
To the assumptions in section 2 we add the following: 
A3. F(•) is a uniform distribution over P. 
,M. U(x,y) = r- k(lx- yl). 
Thus, if a candidate wins the election, he receives an amount (r) for 
winning minus a constant (k) times the distance between his true 
position, or type, and his announced position. 
By A4, we see that if ¥ ~ ~· then there will exist pooling 
equilibria at all positions satisfying r - k(¥ + p) 2 O; there will 
exist no CII hybrid equilibria. If¥ a (~.~), then there will exist 
r CII hybrid equilibria, unique for each parameter specification (D,k)' 
while no pooling equilibria will exist. 
To calculate the CII hybrid equilibria, we begin by 
calculating the separating segment of the equilibrium strategy. From 
section 3 we know that 





s' - 1 s 
<¥ - a) 




which is a first-order linear differential equation. The solution to 
(39) is 
s(a) = ( 40) 
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where h is a constant determined by the value restriction 
U(~,s(~)) = 0. This restriction implies the condition h = ~(~- ~); 
thus after canceling terms, 
1 D r 
s(a) = 2a + 4 - k" 
s(•) is of a particularly simple form: 
as aaii 




In the following four examples, assume D = 4. 
Example 1· Let~= 3. Then there exists pooling equilibria at 
positions p 8 [-1,1]. 
Example z. Let~= 2. Then there exists a pooling equilibrium at 
p = 0. 
( 41) 
( 42) 
Example 1. Let~= 1.S. Then there exists a hybrid equilibrium of 
the form 
s(a) - { 
0 
- ta + t 
See Figure 7. 
if 
if 
4 a 8 [0,3) 
a 8 <1-,2] 
Example!· Let~= 1. Then there exists a hybrid equilibrium of the 
110 
1 form s(a) = 2• Va. See Figure 8. 




We have developed a model which explicitly incorporates the 
ability of candidates to misrepresent themselves to voters in regard 
to their true positions on a policy space. Using equilibrium 
refinement techniques described in Chapter I, we were able to 
eliminate numerous types of symmetric equilibria from consideration 
and were left with equilibrium predictions which, examining the 
comparative statics, have an intuitively realistic feature; namely, as 
the costs of misrepresentation increase, candidate types will be more 
likely to reveal their true position and hence less likely to imitate 
the median candidate. 
Further research will concentrate on, i) asymmetric equilibria 
in the above model, ii) asymmetric priors over candidate types, and 
iii) modeling explicitly a multi-election game in which the costs of 
misrepresentation are endogenously generated. 
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